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Rediscovering Social Investment  
in Developmental Welfare State Policies: 
Back to the Future 
 
The recent stress on the productive potential of social policy provides a new economic rationale for social policy provision. 
However, it is a mistaken perception that the majority of social policies need to be radically adjusted to changes in the 
economic and social order. Rather, this paper argues that we need to better understand the ways in which long-standing 
policies have enabled and continue to facilitate adaptation to ongoing social and economic changes. To fail to do so risks 
severing or otherwise upsetting vital social policy synergies. The paper is based on a dissertation that developed a 
conceptual framework for thinking about social policies in the welfare state that may be both protective and productive; 
that is, that reduce posttax/transfer poverty without decreasing pretax/transfer (market) earnings. Observing that 
some countries with expensive social policies appear to be able to achieve high poverty reduction without adverse effects 
on economic performance, the study argued that theoretical explanations for this pattern are lacking. Applying social 
developmentalist ideas to the welfare state literature, it argued that the severity of the tradeoff between efficiency and 
equality may vary by the types and combinations of social policies that countries employ. The study offered a theoretical 
explanation for how and why different types of conventional social policy that occur across welfare states might be 
expected to produce outcomes that are simultaneously protective and productive. This paper describes the logic 
underlying the effects of what the author defines as developmental welfare state policies (DWSPs). 
 
Key words: Social investment, social development, social policy, welfare states, poverty. 
 
Background and Overview 
Research has begun to examine the effect of a range of welfare state policies on alternative concepts 
of well-being and measures of poverty. However, a review of the literature suggests that there 
remains a need for a theoretically coherent framework to develop systematic expectations about how 
different aspects of welfare state effort interact and relate to various outcomes, including, but not 
limited to those associated with income distribution. The dissertation on which this paper is based 
aimed to make several conceptual contributions. First, it synthesized the relevant literature and 
argued for a new perspective and research direction. Second, it clarified a perspective that supported 
alternative hypotheses—about the positive economic implications of social policy—than those 
offered by mainstream economic theory, based on an older political economic tradition that is 
largely distinct from Keynesianism and that I believe informs developmentalist ideas.1 Third, it 
identified broad characteristics associated with developmental welfare state policies (DWSPs) and 
developed predictions about the way they interact and impact both poverty and labor market 
activity. Fourth, it bridged the welfare state and developmentalist literatures with the intent of 
                                                 
1 Keynesianism became the guiding theoretical framework for understanding the role and impact of social policy, and its 
association with passive, countercyclical, demand-side policies has obscured the simultaneous investment function of 
these same policies, a point raised long ago by Garrett (1998). See Johnson (2010), especially p. 27, footnote 24 and p. 
72, footnote 63) for further discussion.   
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increasing the policy relevance of the former and refining the disparate nature of the latter. Finally, it 
aimed to support future research by developing a principle-based theoretical framework that is 
flexible enough to accommodate additional developmentalist policy dimensions beyond those that I 
associated with the social investment function of the welfare state in my analysis.2  
While touching on several of these areas, my focus in this paper is primarily on summarizing the 
third conceptual contribution of the dissertation. This paper will attempt to demonstrate how it is 
possible to reconceptualize developmentalism, currently a loose collection of ideas, and apply it to 
thinking predictively about comparative social policy (CPS), and especially policy that is 
simultaneously protective and productive. Additionally, I will briefly summarize the tentative 
empirical findings from the dissertation, which were based on a relatively simplistic test of whether 
the policies that I believe reflect developmentalist principles are in fact associated with lower poverty 
posttax/transfer as well as market poverty. 
The history of the welfare state, and its study, has been marked by a series of transitions from one 
phase to another. Regardless of the periodization one applies, this pattern of sequential or 
generational thinking is discernible. The most recent and ongoing stage arguably began with the EU 
slogan of social protection as a productive factor and marches on under the banner of social 
investment, among related labels (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). Unlike developing world welfare 
states, the progress of whose social policy systems has oscillated—expanding and contracting with 
economic exigencies such as procyclical pressures in Latin America (Kim, 2010) or changing 
authoritarian political priorities as in the case of China (Lin, 2010)—the fate of welfare states in 
developed nations has been more evolutionary, continuous and cumulative, where path dependency 
tends to prevail. Study of the welfare state has been driven by the historical circumstances 
confronting it. The need to justify the welfare state marks a stark challenge to the slow moving 
theoretical world of regime typologies and path dependency. Much of this legacy of gradualism is 
owed to the fact that the welfare state emerged through complex and successive social and political 
processes rather than resulting from planning (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). 
Amenta (2003) offers a compelling explanation for the historical progress and possible problem now 
confronting the field: ―the literature on social policy has advanced as far as it has partly because 
there was relative agreement on what was to be explained, while there was disagreement over the 
possible explanations‖ (p. 114). In this context, the continued focus on normative issues of 
redistribution and inequality and reliance on measures of effort (that lack conceptual coherence), 
highlights the limitations of using old theoretical and empirical tools to address pressing new 
problems. The problems now confronting the welfare state are not addressed by the two major 
questions on which, according to Esping-Andersen (2004), welfare comparisons have focused: (1) 
What explains national differences in welfare effort and welfare state type? and (2) What are the 
distributional consequences of social policy variations? The central theoretical question is no longer 
about why welfare states emerged and persisted but rather what they produce; specifically, in terms of 
the productive consequences of distribution. The promise of recent scholarship is hampered by the 
absence of a coherent conceptual framework for developing predictions about social policies that 
are simultaneously protective and productive.  
                                                 
2 The term function is used here in order to recognize that much of the investment impact of the welfare state may be 
implicit or unintended and therefore in need of discovery and explanation. 
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One possible consequence of not resolving the ambiguity surrounding the social investment 
function of welfare states is that we may see the social investment approach as a new and 
discontinuous paradigm where one mistakenly identifies specific or discrete social policies as 
singularly productive, fostering their instrumentalization as either active or passive. Such a 
disembedded approach overlooks the need to explain why the social policies of some countries have 
worked as successfully as they have for as long as they have. It is only by working out a political 
economic explanation for the social investment function of welfare states that social investment can 
be understood as fundamentally more than a new approach or pallid Third Way version of social 
policy (Esping-Andersen, 2002). There is a distinct need to move beyond acknowledging the 
possibility of market failures and vague calls for government intervention and return to affirmative 
engagement with both the productive possibilities of traditional social policy and the inherent limits 
of the market.3 
Arguably there have been three generations of crossnational welfare state research but the progress 
of an emerging fourth generation (as I define it below) is constrained by a lack of theoretical 
guidance. Ongoing research continues to remain focused on the protective effects of social policy (in 
terms of outcomes related to poverty and inequality), which restrains the field‘s ability to explain 
the—often unintended—productive or social investment function of social policies. I will suggest 
below that much of this inability can be traced to the fact that little dialogue has historically occurred 
across the division of labor between poverty research and welfare state research (De Janvry & 
Kanbur, 2006).4 While the discourse pointing toward the potentially productive effects of social policy 
has been growing, it remains programmatically impressionistic and vague, offering little theoretical 
guidance for thinking predictively about social policies (not simply those that are new but especially 
those that are old). 
This ambiguity in the social investment debate has been linked to ―the welfare regime inspiration‖ 
and confusion about ―ensuing policy choices‖ (Antonucci, 2010, pp. 2, 1). I argue both that scholars 
have to relinquish their dependence on the regime typology approach and that the largest share of 
social investment is already being undertaken by particular types of traditional (or old) social policies, 
which I define below as DWSPs.5 Regardless, Antonucci and others are correct to caution that until 
social investment is theoretically clarified as an empirical concept it is difficult (in addition to being 
unwise and risky) to use it as a basis for suggesting policy changes. Social investment remains 
plagued by theoretical ambiguity both in terms of what it means and how it translates into social 
                                                 
3 The prevailing, largely ambiguous economic position on the role of government can be thought of as the second-best 
position (Lipsey, 2007) that has subsumed older theoretical traditions that preceded much formal economic theory. This 
notion will be discussed briefly below. See Johnson (2010) for more detailed discussion. 
4 As Cantillon, Van Mechelen, and Van den Bosch (2004) explain: ―Less is known about the links between welfare state 
arrangements and outcomes than about each of these separately. An important reason for the relative lack of studies on 
this issue is that studies of welfare arrangements and of well-being outcomes employ different data, very much different 
analytical methods, and therefore tend to be carried out by persons with little contact with one another‖ (p. 6). 
5 Typologies tend to achieve generalizability by, to some degree, neglecting policy details. Arts and Gelissen (2002, p. 
139) write: ―typologies are only fruitful to an empirical science that is still in its infancy.‖ They continue: ―a better 
formulation of the theory on which it [the welfare state typology] is based deserves priority. Only then can predictions be 
logically—instead of impressionistically—deduced from theory (p. 155).‖ Regime modeling has focused on what welfare 
states are in the context of why they emerged, expanded and persisted. The why questions pursued by researchers 
(Baldwin, 1996) have arguably been based on a narrow theoretical foundation (Boje, 1996) suited to a particular 
historical context. Reliance on functional and sociopolitical theoretical frameworks (Van Voorhis, 1998, 2002) has 
resulted in a focus on explaining independence from the family or market, redistributive effects, citizen attitudes, and the 
like. I argue that something different is needed: a developmental rationale for social benefits. 
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policy. For instance, it does not explicitly tell us when universalism or in-kind benefits make sense 
(i.e., under what circumstances or conditions such social policies may be a precondition or 
prerequisite for economic growth). Morel et al. (2012, p. 17) correctly trace this ambiguity in part to 
pragmatic judgments about discourse: 
In some ways, one could argue that just as the Myrdals had used some of the 
Conservatives‘ concerns with low fertility and slow growth to argue their case for an 
expansion of social policy in Sweden, so have social investment proponents framed 
their arguments in ways that can respond to neoliberals‘ critique of social spending as 
wasteful and a source of dependency in order to get their ideas across. However that 
might be, this may in fact be one of the social investment perspective‘s weakest 
points as it allows for much ambiguity and tensions in the goals actually assigned to 
the policies implemented in its name. (p. 17) 
Tensions and ambiguities also stem from differing intellectual roots and political influences. Morel et 
al. note that ―while the social investment perspective rests on a number of common themes both at 
the ideational level and in terms of the policy instruments put forward, different aspects are given 
different emphasis by different thinkers and policy makers‖ (p. 17). The result is that ―the social 
investment perspective…covers under the same umbrella a ‗social democratic‘ approach, inspired by 
the example of the Nordic welfare states, and a ‗Third Way‘ approach which represents an ‗Anglo-
liberal‘ view of social policy‖ (p. 19) (see also Jenson, 2009, pp. 41–42, Liddle in the same volume). 
This paper reflects an effort to further delineate the policy logic of the former by more clearly 
distinguishing its political economic roots, fusing the insights of developmentalist and welfare state 
thinking in order to reach a broader understanding of the productive consequences of social policy. 
Situating social investment in a larger intellectual tradition makes it possible to begin to resolve this 
ambiguity and to derive a set of insights (and perhaps eventually, systematized rules) about when and 
why certain social policies should yield protective-productive outcomes, offering guidance on how 
we think about social policies as social investments. For instance, in contrast to the neoliberal view 
and given certain assumptions, I offer an explanation for why a small number of broad or 
encompassing policy instruments may be optimal for maximizing protection and production in the 
long term.  
The possibility that a potentially wide range of social protection measures can have productive 
economic consequences compels scholars to revisit a political economic tradition that allows for 
decisions about distribution to have net positive effects on production. This possibility, in turn, 
implies the occurrence of market failures on a comparatively extensive scale, which supports the 
provision of merit goods on the basis of wide-ranging information failures. In the standard economic 
view, market failures remain limited and second-best policy prescriptions tightly circumscribed by 
information limitations and the likelihood of economic distortions. Arguments for intervention due 
to limited market failure do not clearly indicate which types of social policies are likely to function as 
social investments (Greve, 2007) but rather are limited to those selective interventions that justify a 
residual welfare state. While the standard framework offers suggestions for human capital-enhancing 
initiatives directly related to education and activation, it has little to say about classic social insurance 
or generous universal and in-kind benefits. Adopting a social investment approach based on the 
standard view—rather than supplementing existing policies—could in reality portend the erosion of 
traditional social provision and its replacement by more circumscribed and narrowly targeted Third 
Way-style social policies. Avoiding this eventuality requires us to recognize the role of distribution in 
R E D I S C O V E R I N G  S O C I A L  I N V E S T M E N T  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T A L  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  P O L I C I E S :  






C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
5 
production and clarify the types of social policies that constitute social investments, the 
characteristics of these policies, and the ways in which they interact. 
The paper begins with a brief summary of some of the key limitations and theoretical challenges in 
the literature. Following this preliminary background, the remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. First, I describe how developmentalist principles are synthesized from several literatures, 
most notably the various strands of social development thinking, and how they can be applied to a 
welfare state literature that has not adequately conceptualized how productive social policies may 
work. Second, I relate these principles to existing and widely comparable social policy categories that 
are common across the welfare state literature in order to transcend the constraints of regime 
thinking. Third, I explain why, in a political economic sense, DWSPs should be expected to work as 
they do, explicitly identifying the assumptions that would have to apply for protective-productive 
outcomes to result. This approach draws on the notion of abduction (or inference to the best 
explanation), which allows one to speculate about the sorts of mechanisms that can explain 
observed outcomes, and is especially valuable in cases where theory is underdeveloped, there is a 
need for new ideas, and there are surprising facts or observations to be explained (Minnameier, 
2010). Finally, I briefly discuss some tentative findings and the need for further exploration. The 
purpose of this project is to support future research by developing a conceptual principle-based 
framework that is flexible enough to accommodate evolving hypotheses about additional 
dimensions of DWSPs. 
Introduction to the Central Problem 
The social investment perspective partly rests on a neoliberal interpretation of social policy and 
partly on a much older Nordic legacy of investment thinking reflected in the productivist ideas of 
Gunnar Myrdal from the 1930s that never coalesced into a programmatically defined policy 
paradigm outside (or even inside) of Sweden. Hence, there is considerable ambiguity about what 
exactly is meant by social investment (Leung, 2005). As Morel et al. (2012) note, while different 
terms and labels have been used to describe the productive turn in social policy—such as social 
development, the developmental welfare state, social investment state, enabling state and inclusive 
liberalism—all these analyses point toward a similar policy logic based on what can be labeled social 
investment. The social investment state, said to be about modernizing the welfare state in response to 
new economic realities and social risks, has been widely translated into the need for fundamentally new 
social policies. There is a tendency to focus on the ―productive potential of social policy‖ in having to 
respond to ―a radically changed economic and social order,‖ and to assume that they are not 
productively oriented at present (Morel et al., 2012, p. 8). 
What has been given short shrift is how traditional welfare state policies relate to these new 
conditions. This paper offers a conceptual explanation for the developmental or productive effects 
of more extensive social investments (based on a reappraisal of several traditional social policies), 
recognizing that the social investment approach is not an entirely new paradigm but rather that 
welfare states have served an investment function for some time. The neoliberal view of social 
policy as a cost fundamentally overestimates the successful operation of the free market. The 
challenge for the social investment perspective is to explicitly reconstruct the rationale for old forms 
of social policy (largely preparing in nature), as much as to offer rationales for new forms of social 
policy (largely repairing in nature). In short, using social development ideas to decipher and 
theoretically recover the developmental aspects of social policy in the Global North using the policy 
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language or lexicon that prevails in the welfare state literature.6 What follows is an abbreviated 
intellectual chronology that begins with the desire to explain the bumblebee anomaly, attempts to 
account for our failure to do so, and explicates the need for a new perspective.  
Conventional economic logic suggests that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and equality (Okun, 
1975). Consistent with this perspective, some countries achieve high efficiency along with high 
poverty, while others attain low poverty at high economic cost. Yet some countries do not fit this 
pattern and are able to achieve very low levels of poverty with relatively high levels of economic 
efficiency. Why are Northern European countries in particular, analogous to the bumble bee that is 
able to fly when by conventional economic logic, it should not (Persson, 2000)?7 Generally, evidence 
for the negative impact of welfare states on economic performance is mixed and any productive 
benefits of social policy remain relatively poorly understood (Goul Andersen, 2007). As Korpi 
(2005) notes, ―the fact that theoretically predicted negative effects of taxes and welfare states are 
very difficult to verify in areas where they are most likely to turn up and in which we also have 
empirically useful data should generate discussion on the theoretical foundations of these 
hypotheses‖ (p. 207). The problem, as Hagen and Sitter (2006) note, is that ―the empirical evidence 
is used to refute the neoliberal recipe of how economic efficiency is (or should be) produced, 
without, however, being able to identify what mechanisms explain better what is observed‖ (p. 3).8 
The case of the bumblebee, in which a static object is governed by different stability laws than a 
dynamic object, poses a challenge to theoretical oversimplifications that sometimes occur in 
economics (Lindert, 2004b). Explanations for anomalous outcomes have yet to be developed. 
An integrative assessment and synthesis of the relevant literature reveals that (1) welfare states face a 
variety of pressures and dilemmas, (2) there is a long legacy of conceptual ambiguity surrounding the 
                                                 
6 Nordic researchers such as Kangas and Palme (2005) have begun to focus on the developmental aspect of social policy. 
In particular, they study how to bridge the divide between development studies and study of the welfare state and 
explore how social policy may facilitate economic development. However, these efforts have not explicitly revisited the 
social development literature or attempted to define developmentalism in the context of comparative welfare state 
research. Kangas and Palme (2005) is part of the UNRISD series, Social Policy in a Development Context, which examines the 
ways that social policy can be instrumental to economic development while maintaining its goal of social protection and 
equity. In a recent report by the Institute for Futures Studies (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2009), the social investment 
paradigm is identified as the defining feature of the new welfare state and it suggests the need for new strategies for 
achieving equality with growth. In contrast, developmentalism—as I redefine it here—is concerned with the types of 
policies that Myrdal historically saw as investments in the population and as a complement to the social rights 
perspective (Lindh, 2009). 
7 In remarks before the Social Democratic Extra Party Congress in Stockholm, 10–12 March 2000, likening the Swedish 
welfare state to a bumblebee, former Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, suggested that ―with his altogether too 
heavy body and thin wings he should not be able to fly,‖ but he noted that ―all the same he does.‖ According to 20th 
century folklore, the laws of aerodynamics prove that the bumble bee should be incapable of flight, as it does not have 
the capacity (in terms of wing size or beat per second) to achieve flight with the degree of wing loading necessary, and 
yet, not being aware of scientists proving it cannot fly, the bumblebee succeeds. John McMasters (1989) recounted an 
anecdote about an unnamed Swiss aerodynamicist at a dinner party who performed some rough calculations and 
concluded, presumably in jest, that according to the equations, bumblebees cannot fly. In later years, McMasters backed 
away from this origin, suggesting that there could be multiple sources, and that the earliest he has found was a reference 
in the 1934 French book Le vol des insectes by M. Magnan. Magnan is reported to have written that he and a M. Saint-
Lague had applied the equations of air resistance to insects and found that their flight was impossible, but that ―One 
shouldn‘t be surprised that the results of the calculations don‘t square with reality.‖ It is believed that the calculations 
that purported to show that bumblebees cannot fly are based upon a simplified linear treatment of oscillating aerofoils. 
The method underestimates the additional lift generated by the bumblebee‘s wings that allow it to fly. 
8 See Johnson (2010) for a more extensive discussion of the mixed economic evidence. 
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welfare state, (3) welfare state research has evolved over time in terms of the approach to effort and 
outcomes and in response to changing historical circumstances, (4) there are select research findings 
that underlie the possibility of simultaneously protective and productive social policy, and (5) there 
remain several metatheoretical concerns that have inhibited conceptual progress on understanding 
the potentially productive effects of social policy. While it not necessary to discuss points 1 and 2 in 
this paper, I will briefly discuss points 3, 4, and 5. 
While it is impossible in this paper to delve into the various pressures facing welfare states or the 
definitional ambiguity referred to as the dependent variable problem using the metaphor of generations 
(Esping-Andersen, 1989, 1990; Mäkinen, 1999), it is possible to briefly classify major studies in the 
comparative welfare state literature. Following Kvist and Torfing (1996), the first generation can be 
characterized as focused on the emergence and growth of the welfare state, the second as describing 
dissimilarities between welfare states, and the third as emphasizing the welfare mix and focusing 
more explicitly on the outcomes of welfare states (Table 1). Among the innovations has been a 
move away from using crude public expenditure measures to describe welfare states‘ efforts toward 
typologies of welfare regimes, and from examining income-based measures of poverty and inequality 
as the main effects of welfare states toward a focus on broader notions of deprivation. However, 
while we know much about the effects of the welfare state on poverty rates, social rights and income 
inequality, advances beyond the third generation have been slowed by failing to fully consider how 
potentially productive outcomes of the welfare state are related to the level and type of welfare 
effort. 
Table 1. The Generations of Welfare State Research 
Generation Central research focus  
First Indicators of industrialism, role of the state, and political power used to predict welfare 
state expansion based on aggregate social expenditure 
Second Challenges the validity of aggregate-expenditure measures in favor of structural and 
institutional features such as the policy or benefit design and delivery system; largely 
continues focus on welfare state expansion (or retrenchment) but also begins to 
examine poverty and inequality 
Third Explicit shift toward examining the results that the different regimes have produced in 
terms of poverty rates, social rights and income equality using both expenditure levels 
and eligibility rules; focus is on outcomes not welfare effort per se9 
Fourth? Studies focus on a wide range of well-being related outcomes beyond economic well-
being and that may have productive implications beyond distribution; it is not at all 
clear how the theoretical possibility of productive outcomes relates to the way that one 
thinks about the extensive array of categories of welfare state effort 
 
Advances in scholarship have been driven by several factors, among them the changing conditions 
confronting the welfare state. During the rapid expansion of welfare state programs, scholarly 
                                                 
9 Among the increasingly pluralistic focus of this generation, particular attention has been paid to questions of inequality 
among specific groups (e.g., women) and the impact of gender on welfare benefits, labor market participation, earnings, 
and the like. 
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interest was focused on predictors of welfare state development. Over time, with the diffusion and 
elaboration of welfare state programs, understanding of the welfare state became more nuanced and 
refined, reflected in part in the movement toward typologies. Similarly, as the welfare state came to 
be seen as having varied forms, this raised scholarly interest in the types of policies (or regimes) 
most successful in reducing poverty. While there has been gradual progress in delineating or 
disaggregating aspects of welfare state effort and effects, the gap between what we know about its 
harmful versus beneficial aspects has not substantially narrowed. Current socioeconomic 
circumstances have led to fresh questions about whether different types of welfare state policies can 
have positive effects with minimal costs. I argue that a potential fourth generation of research should 
be denoted by explicitly analyzing productive outcomes alongside distributive ones. As such, I would 
suggest that a fourth generation has not yet coalesced. There is no coherent theoretical framework 
for rethinking welfare state effort in terms of its impact on outcomes beyond but associated with 
income poverty and inequality. In other words, there is no theoretical framework, beyond those that 
have guided welfare state research for decades, which informs thinking about the implications of 
poverty for economic development, systematically considering social protection as a productive 
factor, and exploring the possible economically beneficial impact of welfare state effort.10 
While each generation of research is examined in greater detail in Johnson (2010), we can clearly 
discern and briefly state some central research findings. What do we know? In the broadest terms we 
know that social policy appears to have a positive effect on reducing poverty above and beyond 
macroeconomic conditions. There are wide crosscountry differences in the level and mixture of 
public and private expenditure. Similarly, there remains a diversity of outcomes across countries in 
terms of both poverty rates and economic performance. Select crossnational research findings show 
substantial differences in levels of market poverty and also show, despite relatively similar levels in 
welfare state spending, posttax/transfer poverty rates vary considerably; as noted above, only mixed 
evidence supports the notion of a uniform efficiency-equality tradeoff. It appears that what happens 
within social expenditure matters as much for reducing poverty and inequality as overall government 
spending. However, we do not know much about which policy combinations or clusters are 
particularly beneficial in avoiding poverty with minimal economic costs, and whether this is true 
across countries and their varied institutional contexts. Recognizing the link between variations 
within expenditure and diversity in economic and social performance across countries can aid 
understanding of whether and how the welfare state contributes to economic performance. 
While we are beginning to understand the variety of potential effects of the welfare state, and to see 
some connections between welfare state effort and the varied effects, what is missing is a conceptual 
framework for thinking systematically about how welfare state effort and effects are related. We 
need to clarify which types of efforts should have which effects. Arguably, what is most problematic 
about existing approaches to thinking about the welfare state and what it produces, and hence why 
there is a need for a new perspective, can be summarized in terms of three metatheoretical concerns: 
1) limitations of ways that welfare state effort has been measured; 2) limitations in the welfare state 
outcomes that have been examined, e.g., narrowness of outcomes and weak measurement; and 3) 
the consequences of thinking about welfare state arrangements and outcomes separately.  
                                                 
10 Research remains confined to distributional outcomes and does not explicitly deal with the productive implications of 
distribution or how the possibility of social protection as a productive factor might lead to more theoretically coherent 
or predictive thinking about a disparate array of measures of welfare state effort. 
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There have been a variety of approaches to measuring effort, from simple expenditure methods to 
regime classifications. However, simple expenditure approaches neither differentiate nor relate 
important types of expenditure, and regime categorizations are likely to miss important policy 
differences within a regime and may ignore policy similarities across regimes. Regime typologies tend 
to treat institutions as discrete and focus on distributional outcomes. Rather, I advocate a more 
nuanced approach to thinking about variations in policy metrics that are shared across countries 
(similar to Bradshaw‘s [2007] policy packages) (see also Hauser, 1993). Nearly all countries use both 
universal and means-tested benefits, and have some programs that are targeted to those with 
particular status. Although the elements are similar, the welfare state policy mix is potentially diverse 
and consequential for household-level poverty and economic activity. For instance, an intermediate 
approach may be to examine overall expenditures, the extent to which expenditures are limited to 
low-income families (versus universal), focused on cash (versus in-kind), and related to other types 
of policies consistent with developmentalist thought. With regard to welfare state effects, research 
needs to move beyond a sole focus on distributive effects to incorporate some simultaneous 
measure of productive effects. The key task is to discern developmentalist policy principles and 
translate them into the types of policies that most closely express these principles. 
The central challenge is to reconsider how we think about both, effort (more coherently) and 
outcomes (more broadly), in order to effectively relate them. Specifically, welfare state effort has not 
been systematically reconsidered in light of the potential productive effects increasingly ascribed to 
social policy. Thinking about a broader set of outcomes compels a different approach to thinking 
about effort. The traditional emphasis on treating welfare state effort and effects separately has 
inhibited thinking about the links between policy and poverty that may help account for anomalous 
cases. The possibility that welfare states may do more than reduce income poverty suggests that the 
links between effort and outcomes should be considered not simply in the context of distribution 
(protection) but also productive efficiency; hence the need to return to political economy. Now that 
the possibility of productive outcomes is being discussed we can no longer think about effort in the 
same way as when poverty or inequality reduction was the sole anticipated effect of the welfare state. 
This forces us to reconsider dichotomies and think about synergies. To better understand this 
dynamic, it is necessary to consider policy as interactive and cumulative, rather than confining our 
thinking about effort strictly to regimes or specific and isolated policies entailing either a productive 
investment or passive consumption.11 
                                                 
11 Rather than viewing a particular country‘s (or group of countries‘) institutional features and policy characteristics as 
unique or focusing on a specific policy (as being either active or passive or to involve either investment or consumption), 
it may be important to account for possible policy interactions or synergistic effects. Policies interact and may have 
synergistic effects (Delamonica & Mehrotra, 2006; Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2006) resulting from what Myrdal (1954) 
referred to as a process of cumulative causation that involves increasing returns (e.g., Berger, 2008; Dykema, 1986; Streeten, 
1990, 1998). Poverty-reducing strategies may entail interactions among policies. The impact of appropriately designed 
combinations may be greater than the sum of the individual parts (Kanbur & Squire, 2001; Mkandawire, 2001). As 
Nelson (2004) argues, if we refrain from analyzing how separate social transfers and benefits interact in the distributive 
process and produce certain outcomes, ―we are likely to end up with misleading results and mistaken conclusions about 
the linkages between certain social policy structures and outcomes‖ (p. 386). This argument in part violates Tinbergen‘s 
(1952, 1956, 1958) analytic rule, where except under rare circumstances, a separate tool or instrument is needed to 
achieve individual economic objectives (i.e., two goals cannot be achieved effectively with the same policy tool). It argues 
that unless there are indications that the issues are linked, improvements in one area are unlikely to lead to 
improvements in other areas (e.g., increased rates of economic growth are unlikely to lead to broader income 
distribution, improved literacy, or better health in the absence of programs targeting these concerns). In contrast, this is 
precisely the point of Myrdal (1974, p. 730), who suggests that knowledge of the ―coefficients of interrelation between 
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A reconceptualized notion of developmentalism can help to guide thinking about how existing social 
policies may be related to each other and how they may yield protective-productive outcomes. As I 
argue in the following section, a developmentalist framework can help us think about social policy 
effort in a more conceptually coherent way by helping to clarify the link between social and 
economic processes (Midgley, 1995). Developmentalism can help fuse the insights of research about 
welfare states and research on poverty in order to derive expectations about the possible protective 
and productive (or investment) impact of welfare state policies. It is possible to devise a set of 
developmentalist principles that point toward several existing types of social policy that are likely to 
function as DWSPs. The potential contribution of developmentalism centers on its ability to 
illuminate both the types of social policies that are compatible as well as their effects. In order to do 
so, I reconceptualize social development around the notion of welfare developmentalism, devise 
policy-relevant developmentalist principles and link them to DWSPs. I believe that the framework 
outlined below has the potential to assist emerging research to overcome its inability to empirically 
investigate the claims underlying the notion of social protection as a productive factor. 
Reconceptualizing Social Development 
In this section, I attempt to formulate a coherent notion of welfare developmentalism and 
developmentalist principles from disparate streams of developmentalist thought and related ideas. I 
introduce the developmentalist perspective as a way to better conceptualize the impact of specific 
social policies and the link between effort and productive effects. This section conceptually identifies 
welfare state policies that reflect a developmentalist perspective and proposes hypotheses about their 
interaction and effects. Given the larger political economic tradition that is often associated with 
crossnational research, I begin by noting the absence of a detailed social democratic political 
economy that explicitly links social and economic policy. Developmentalism is located in an older 
classical political economic tradition that recognizes these links and theoretically grounds attempts to 
think about the productive benefits of social policy. Next, I address the conceptual ambiguity in 
developmentalist thought by devising a coherent notion of inclusive developmentalism from which 
several broad policy-related principles and characteristics are inferred. Finally, I link a policy-relevant 
set of developmentalist principles to existing welfare state policies about which predictions—
pertaining to both protective and productive outcomes—can be derived. In short, I will address why 
social development? What does it offer? What is it missing? And how can it be synthesized with 
other insights?  
Absence of detailed social democratic political economy 
Before delving a bit more deeply into what we mean by developmentalism, we should ask whether 
there are good alternative theoretical explanations for countries that do not fit an efficiency-equality 
tradeoff pattern. While there have been efforts at understanding the benefits of various welfare state 
policies, there does not appear to be a particularly coherent theoretical basis for these arguments 
(Gough 2001a, 2001b). One potential theoretical basis is Keynesian economics, but this tends to 
argue for any types of policies that provide more income to those who will spend it, where increased 
                                                                                                                                                             
all the conditions in the social system‖ is imprecise. Developmentalism suggests that it may not simply be the case that 
more separate instruments are needed but instead fewer and more adequate (i.e., comprehensive or institutional) policy 
instruments preferable, depending upon the economic assumptions one accepts about the optimal operation of the 
market. If it is true that coefficients of interrelation are imprecise, market failures are extensive, and it is misleading to 
dichotomize policies as singularly passive or activating, we can ask which policies are most likely to circumvent the 
second-best concerns of information limitations and economic disincentives. 
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demand results in beneficial macroeconomic consequences. A weakness of this view is that all types 
of redistribution that lead to more spending are seen as comparable; a related issue is that 
redistribution itself is only a means to more spending. One can also revisit classic philosophical 
discussions such as those offered by T. H. Marshal for guidance but these too are left wanting in 
terms of specific programmatic guidance (see Johnson, 2010, pp. 28–31; Johnson, 2014a). 
An alternative perspective has been called productivist—a term originally used by Swedish policy 
makers (see Andersson, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 1992; Kuhnle, 2002) to refer to policies that focus 
on material needs, investment in human capabilities, and that promote participation in the economy 
(Midgley & Tang, 2001). In contrast to the Keynesian view, productivist policy implicitly views 
different types of redistribution as having different effects and it views redistribution not merely as a 
means to an end of more spending but as a precondition of growth (note, though, this is not yet 
particularly well-formulated). Esping-Andersen (1994, p. 713) writes: ―the unique contribution of 
Swedish socialism was its idea of productivist social policy. Its leading theoreticians stood liberalism 
on its head, arguing that social policy and equality were necessary preconditions for economic 
efficiency, which, in turn, was a prerequisite for the democratic socialist society.‖12  
The productivist, preventive, investment-oriented and developmental aspects of welfare state 
policies (Atkinson, 1995a; Esping-Andersen, 2000a, b, 2002; Gough, 2001a) remain insufficiently 
understood. This is not to say that a preventive approach cannot be contrasted with a curative one; 
the latter is based on the ―reparation of damages caused by the realization of social and economic 
risks‖ (Fouarge, 2003, p. 36). However, as I will discuss below, while the characteristics of such a 
preventive approach have been impressionistically associated with the so-called Nordic model 
(Korpi, 1980; Ryner, 2007), and while there have been attempts to empirically investigate whether 
and why Nordic countries achieve low poverty, there has been little systematic exposition of the 
theory that underlies these empirical investigations (Milner, 1989, 1994). Specifically, there has been 
little development of predictive hypotheses about particular types of policies and their interaction 
that would lead to low poverty across countries. 
One potential candidate for generating predictive hypotheses about the particular policies 
responsible for these seemingly anomalous outcomes is the Third Way (Giddens, 1998, 2000, 2001). 
However, this perspective is deficient. The Third Way in part reflects an attempt to promote 
particular types of policies, broadly, those that attempt to promote both equality and efficiency, but 
was also in part devised as an electoral strategy (Ryner, 2010).13 More specifically, its key policy 
                                                 
12 Productivism is sometimes defined as promoting economic productivity and growth as the sole purpose of human 
organization. For instance, Anthony Giddens (1994, p. 175) arguably mischaracterizes productivism as ―an ethos in 
which ‗work,‘ as paid employment, has been separated out in a clear-cut way from other domains of life.‖ This is not 
necessarily the case as in Scandinavia, where women appear to have been successful in combining their dual role as 
mothers and workers (Kangas & Palme, 2005). There is a significant difference between saying that economic 
productivity and growth is the purpose of human organization and life itself (which is exclusionary of social concerns) 
and that a great many social concerns have economic implications (which is inclusionary of social concerns). The 
question hinges in part on how broadly utility is defined. Refer to Andersson (2005) for discussion of the various uses of 
the term productivism. For an excellent and thorough discussion of what has been framed as the difference between 
productivism and developmentalism, refer to Lee (2007). The relationship of productivism to developmentalism is 
discussed further in Johnson (2010). 
13 There is an unresolved debate about whether the Third Way is associated with T. H. Marshall and his emphasis on 
rights and responsibilities (Giddens, 1998; Smith, 1998) or whether Marshall is associated with old social democracy 
(Dwyer, 2004; Kessler-Harris & Vaudagna, 2009). I believe this stems from the ambiguity associated with social 
citizenship rights and its vague implications for the type and level of benefits. 
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principles have been described by Giddens (2007b) as: (1) hold the political center ground (avoid a 
class-based appeal), (2) ensure the economy is strong (i.e., social justice depends on a robust 
economy, not the other way around), (3) invest in public services while reforming them to increase 
competition and choice, (4) create a new contract between state and citizens based upon 
responsibilities as well as rights, and (5) do not allow any issues to be monopolized by the political 
right.14 
The Third Way idea emerged in the UK where the focus was on demand-side Keynesianism and not 
social planning (Ryner, 2002; see also Bonoli and Powell 2002). The Third Way focus on 
―reconstructing the welfare state‖ (Giddens, 1998, p. 113) implies that social policy is not currently 
productive.15 Additionally, the Third Way tends to assume that policy has pursued excessive rights to 
the neglect of responsibilities. Developmentalism, as I define it, is less concerned with the balance 
between rights and responsibilities than with the types of social policies that promote growth16; it 
views benefits not as entirely unconditional or passive but as having investment- and supply-side 
implications (Lister, 2004; Ryner, 2002). In the Third way the market mechanism is not modified ex 
ante but rather welfare state measures are employed ex post (i.e., as a compensatory corrective) when 
people cannot manage to make ends meet (Ryner, 2002). The Third Way focus is on making 
unproductive individuals more productive; it reflects a focus on the individual poor as opposed to 
structure (Walters, 2000). Developmentalism, in contrast, is focused on both individual and 
structural limitations, and sees social policy as less a cost than a preventive investment.17 In 
                                                 
14 Anthony Giddens‘ Third Way embodies one popular expression of the mentality that a new knowledge-based 
economy requires a new welfare state and a new set of social policies that emphasize responsibilities and activity over 
rights and passivity (Nikolai, 2009). It has been characterized as a coherent set of ideas and supply side policies (Green-
Pedersen, van Kersbergen, & Hemerijck, 2001) and particular Third Way policies have been linked to tax policy, 
macroeconomic policy, reform of welfare state schemes, ALMP, flexible labor, and labor market participation (Blair-
Schröder, 1999). The perceived need to modernize social democracy is based on the Eurosclerosis thesis, which 
presumes that old social democracy is no longer sustainable (Andersson, 2005; Ryner, 2002). The Third Way has some 
roots in aspects of social democracy (Ryner, 2002) but drew selectively on it (e.g., Andersson, 2009a, 2009b; Føllesdal, 
2002; Mjøset, 1992, Tuomioja, 1998, 2003).  
15 There is an extensive literature on the Third Way and how it differs from traditional or old social democracy (see 
Andersson, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009a; Ryner, 2002, Whyman, 2003, 2005), but developmentalism, as I define it, has not 
been part of the debate. In general, I see developmentalism as having more in common with traditional or old social 
democracy (than the Third Way), though they differ in that developmentalism explicitly seeks to identify the types of 
policies that should have productive outcomes. There is no clear conception of social democratic political economy or 
precise view on the role of social policy in social democracy. 
16 The Third Way is based on a communitarian contractual approach ―where productive participation is seen as the basis 
of citizenship‖ (Andersson, 2005, p. 14) and it is possible to minimize the harmful societal effects of redistribution. 
Developmentalism suggests that equality (by maximizing the productive potential of all citizens) is a precondition for 
efficiency so that entitlements and rights can lead to productive participation (Fink et al., 2001; Lister, 2003) rather than 
being contingent on participation. 
17 The idea of more extensive intervention in the economy is related to the concepts of socioeconomic rationalization (e.g., 
Andersson, 2005; Eyerman, 1985; Ryner, 2002) and the integral welfare state (e.g., Donnison, 1962; Mishra, 1984). Both 
reflect the attempt to devise a new and better organized society through orderly production and distribution as opposed 
to the ―inefficiency of private capital and traditional class structure‖ (Eyerman, 1985, p. 786). Implied in the view that 
economic production and social reproduction is unified (Myrdal, 1932a, b) is the notion that the economic and social are 
largely indistinguishable (i.e., there is no separate social dimension). Though these policies evolved pragmatically, a 
deeper coherence that is dependent on the interaction of encompassing policies is implied. In contrast, the Third Way 
entails a more narrow focus on human capital in terms of education and lifelong learning, implying that it is possible to 
clearly distinguish between policies that reflect an investment or cost (Andersson, 2005). From this perspective, it is 
possible to pick and choose from a menu of options and implement whichever combinations seem most desirable 
(Kenworthy, 2004). However, this rests uneasily with the notion of institutional complementarities and synergistic policy 
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theorizing about how to steer the results of production, emphasizing the full utilization of resources, 
developmentalism suggests that it should be possible to identify and explain policies that lead to 
productivity (not just solidarity or security), prevent inefficiencies associated with poverty and 
reduce the costs of insecurity and social risk. 
I argue that policy-level heterogeneity can be understood using a developmentalist-inspired 
theoretical framework and that it makes sense to search for developmentalist policy clusters as 
opposed to a productivist world (Holliday, 2000; Lee & Ku, 2007; Room, 2002), social investment 
state (Giddens, 1998; Lister, 2004), or single policies that are exclusively productivist (Hudson & 
Kühner, 2009). Social development may aid welfare state research in identifying and understanding 
how different policy dimensions of the welfare state interact. These perspectives are mutually 
beneficial. Crossnational comparative research lacks a theoretically coherent productive rationale for 
the welfare state while social development theory has not been fully integrated into social policy 
thinking in the developed world.18 The latter is in need of focus, refinement, and application while 
the former is in need of theoretical guidance and policy relevance. A social development-inspired 
(i.e., developmentalist) framework can offer a set of policy-relevant principles with which to (1) analyze 
existing policies in terms of rethinking dichotomies and (2) make predictions about the productive 
effects of existing social policies. 
I situate what I refer to broadly as developmentalist policy in an older, classical political economic 
tradition that is partly distinct from standard economics (see Johnson, 2010, pp. 84–88). This older 
political economic tradition emphasizes the implausibility of thinking about distribution and 
production separately. This tradition reminds us that the welfare state should not simply be seen as a 
compensatory response to the social costs of 19th century capitalism, but also as a contributor to 
sustainable economic development and growth. Unfortunately, little effort has been exerted to 
consider social policy from the perspective of the classical political economic tradition. The most 
extensive attempts to understand the relationship between economic and social policy in the 
developed world, and contest the efficiency-equality tradeoff, have occurred in the Nordic context 
(see Johnson, 2010, pp. 81–84 for discussion of the limitations of the Nordic or social democratic 
approach). The social development perspective can be redefined to inform a Nordic-inspired 
political economy that has largely reflected vague principles or values but not spoken to specific 
social policies or their economic consequences. Formulating developmentalist policy principles and 
identifying DWSPs requires that the insights of social development theory, political economic ideas 
of scholars like Myrdal and welfare state categorizations be synthesized. The following section 
translates developmentalist insights into the welfare state context in order to provide a framework 
for deriving expectations about potentially productive social policies. 
                                                                                                                                                             
effects that may be associated with large ongoing and preventive social investments. As Esping-Andersen (2002, p. 5) 
notes, ―the Third Way may be criticized for its unduly selective appropriation of social democratic policy.‖ One example 
is its ―tendency to believe that activation may substitute for conventional income maintenance guarantees.‖ 
18 Owing to the distance between development studies and the study of welfare policies in the developed countries 
(Mkandawire, 2007), the application of social developmentalism has tended to be relegated to the poor and inactive; 
invoked almost exclusively on behalf of grassroots, nongovernmental, or private sector solutions. While it may acquire 
currency in minimalist welfare states or in the aid to third world context, it may remain negligible in its contribution to 
informing larger policy debates in the developed world. Indeed, it may owe its current rather marginal status to its distance 
from these larger welfare state social policy literatures and the population on which it is focused (i.e., poor welfare 
clients). This study attempts to translate some of its basic ideas (many of which are implicit in northern European 
welfare states) to these larger literatures. 
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Overcoming conceptual ambiguity in developmentalist thought 
Social development, one aspect of the construct I am defining more broadly as developmentalism, 
arises from a variety of disparate perspectives (Midgley, 2003a, 2003b; Mkandawire, 2001) that have 
not coalesced into a cohesive, viable alternative to traditional economic logic.19 Social development 
is not a theory (Midgley, 1995) in that it is not composed of ―a set of hypotheses or propositions, 
linked by logical arguments, and advanced to explain an area of empirical reality or type of 
phenomenon‖ (Jary & Jary, 1991, p. 519). The absence of a clear definition prevents its rigorous 
theoretical and practical application to understanding social policy. At present it offers ―no clear 
theory of how social policy acts on development-enhancing social factors so as to induce growth, 
nor agreement on patterns of growth that are most appropriate to meeting the spectrum of social 
goals that are now on both national and international agendas‖ (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 22). However, 
I believe it can be redefined and combined with other perspectives to illuminate how ―social policies 
can (and often do) produce the favorable initial conditions that support economic development‖ 
(Mkandawire, 2009, p. 3). 
Below are several characteristics of social development, according to the classic work by James 
Midgley (1995, pp. 25–28):  
 The process of social development is inextricably linked to economic development. 
 Social development has an interdisciplinary focus that draws on the insights of the various 
social sciences, especially political economy. 
 Social development invokes a sense of process; it is a dynamic concept in which the notion of 
growth and change is explicit. 
 The process of change is progressive in nature and reflects faith in the prospects of human 
betterment and social improvement. 
 Social development is interventionist in that rather than believing that social improvements 
occur naturally as a result of the economic market or inevitable historical forces, organized 
efforts will bring about improvements in social welfare. 
 Social development goals are fostered through various strategies to link social interventions 
with economic development efforts; these strategies reflect different beliefs or ideologies and 
a pragmatic viewpoint is required to synthesize them. 
 Social development is inclusive or universalistic in scope and not focused primarily on needy 
individuals. 
 The goal of social development is the promotion of social welfare, where social problems are 
satisfactorily managed, social needs are met, and social opportunities are created. 
Social development can be formally defined as ―a process of planned social change designed to 
promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of 
economic development‖ (Midgley, 1995, p. 25). The basic requirements for attaining a condition of 
social well-being are ―the management of social problems, the meeting of needs, and the 
enhancement of opportunities‖ (Midgley, 1995, p. 13).20 Midgley, perhaps its leading theorist, 
                                                 
19 See Johnson (2010) for more on the closely related terms of social development, developmental welfare, welfare 
developmentalism, and developmentalism.  
20 Midgley notes that there are several definitions of social development in current use, including in psychology, 
sociology, social work, and development studies. The definition used by Midgley originated with Hobhouse (1913, 1924), 
which unlike Marxist and Social Darwinist theories ―stressed the role of human agency in bringing about progressive 
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differentiates it from three institutionalized approaches for promoting social welfare: social 
philanthropy, social work, and social administration (i.e., social service or social policy, which is 
inextricably linked to the contemporary welfare state).  
In Midgley‘s (1995, p. 16) words, the key difference between the social development approach, 
which he suggests has not been widely adopted, and the other approaches, which have been widely 
adopted, is the attempt to ―link social policies and programmes directly to a comprehensive process 
of economic development.‖ However, social development, which traces its roots to a fragmented 
literature, remains theoretically underdeveloped and largely undefined in programmatic terms 
(Midgley, 1995, 2003a, 2006). Despite relatively widespread agreement on the interdependence of 
social and economic development efforts, social development is a viewpoint that arises from a 
variety of disparate perspectives that have not yet coalesced into a uniform outlook. 
In light of these concerns, this section focuses on clarifying what is meant by social development 
and seeks to forge a more cohesive and critical vision of welfare developmentalism and productive 
social policy. I follow the social developmentalists in ―challenging the neoliberal claim that social 
expenditures harm the economy‖ (Midgley & Tang, 2001, p. 244). However, I use social 
development not to formulate new approaches to harmonizing social and economic development, 
which has historically been its central focus, but rather to understand how existing social policies in 
developed welfare states may already do so. This approach marks a stark departure from the way in 
which social development has been used to date. 
Social development scholars have noted the importance of systematically developing propositions 
about the conditions under which investments in human development have important returns 
(Beverly & Sherraden, 1997). Along these lines, other scholars have called for a comprehensive 
formulation of what critical social development practice involves in terms of social policy 
intervention (Midgley, 2001). I develop a critical perspective on social development that is somewhat 
distinct from social development theorists. I reconsider the relation between development studies 
and welfare state studies, synthesizing ideas from both and elaborating on what has been termed the 
inclusive strand of welfare developmentalism (UNDESA, 1971, Kwon, 2007). I redefine this 
perspective within the context of developed welfare states as the attempt to understand existing social 
policy interventions, the effects of which appear to be at odds with neoliberal explanations. 
Combining developmentalist ideas with policy-oriented insights from welfare state research yields a 
coherent explanatory framework for understanding the productive (reproductive) effects of social 
policy in industrial countries.21 
                                                                                                                                                             
social change‖ (Midgley, 2006, p. 1236). Social development ideas influenced both the expansion of government social 
provisions (and evolution of Western welfare statism following World War II) and the emergence of social development in 
the Global South. 
21 The critical perspective in social development pertains to a vision of what an alternative, just society would consist of and 
implies a criticism of existing arrangements (Midgley, 2001, p. 47). However, it does not speak in programmatic terms to 
societies in which poverty and inequality is not (or rather is no longer) so pervasive, and therefore to the types of policies 
that may serve to prevent poverty. The sense in which the term critical was applied in my original dissertation on which 
this paper is based pertains to reframing the normative challenge that social development implicitly poses to mainstream 
economics as an explicit effort to develop alternative hypotheses to those of the mainstream and examine the productive 
potential of redistribution. The same economic orthodoxy that has led to distorted development in the Global South 
may eventually lead to retrenchment in the Global North if the connections between production and distribution are not 
better understood (Myrdal, 1974). An important part of this project involves revisiting, recovering, and reinfusing 
contemporary development thinking with old political economic insights. Arguing for new social policies that may be able 
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I can only very briefly summarize the history, evolution, and extensions of social development 
before discussing its limitations vis-à-vis existing social policy and the need for a theoretical synthesis 
(see Johnson, 2010, for detailed discussion). Social development emerged in the Global South 
around colonialism.22 Under Gunnar Myrdal, the UN Economic and Social Council articulated the 
first and only international statement of principles of social policy underlying what came to be 
known as the inclusive strand of welfare developmentalism in 1971. It reflected, for the first time, a 
unified socioeconomic approach to planning in developing countries, which transcended the narrow 
focus on economic growth in favor of integrating economic and social planning. Midgley suggests 
that this conception was explicitly based on a state-directed development process and was 
compatible with the ideals of modernization that prevailed in development thinking at the time. This 
criticism of the tendency in economics to draw a distinct line between economic and social 
phenomena, separating social development from economic development, was groundbreaking. 
Unfortunately, it failed to have a substantial impact on policy in developing countries because of 
adverse macroeconomic conditions and the ascendancy of neoliberalism. 
While the renewed focus of UN activity in the social development area has been on translating 
lessons from developed countries to developing countries, the focus of social development writers 
(e.g., Midgley) has been on trying to develop it into a more comprehensive notion.23 Specifically, 
Midgley (1995) attempts to synthesize a wide-ranging development-related literature into a universal 
model that can be applied at local, regional, and national levels in both industrialized and developing 
nations. Arguing that welfare state policies have generally foundered in the Global South (Midgley, 
2003a) he advocates an approach that relies less on direct government services and transfer 
payments. Instead, Midgley argues for harmonizing individual enterprise, the market, community 
participation, and governmental activities, where the state would help guide the process through 
investments in education, health, job training, and infrastructure.  
Importantly, the focus on pluralism and pragmatism reflected in Midgley‘s perspective contrasts with 
standard approaches in industrialized nations in which economic and social policy are largely 
bifurcated and is a response to the neoliberals who argue that nearly all types of state intervention 
will lead to economic failures. However, this perspective uncritically, if implicitly, accepts 
economists‘ characterization of existing social policy as largely unproductive. Both UN and academic 
contributions have focused on developing countries and the problems of underdevelopment and 
widespread poverty (Midgley, 1997) rather than understanding whether and how current social 
policies in Western nations serve to foster economic development.24 In order to be useful in helping 
                                                                                                                                                             
reconcile the economic and social is not equivalent to contending that some existing policies reconcile the two because 
at some fundamental level they cannot be fully separated. 
22 As Midgley and Tang (2001, p. 244) note, ―events in Europe provided an intellectual framework for developmental 
welfare.‖ However, ―it was in the British colonial territories that social development ideas were first translated into 
practical programmes.‖ While ―its ideational roots in the west are well-known‖ (Midgley, 1995, p. 62), its applicability to 
the West is only now beginning to be reconstructed (see Mkandawire, 2006a for further discussion). Very little is known 
about its expression in western social policy, and developing this idea was a central task of the dissertation. 
23 The UN has renewed its focus on welfare developmentalism through the UN Development Programme‘s (UNDP) 
issuance of its first (1990) and subsequent Human Development Reports (1995, 1996), the Copenhagen World Summit 
on Social Development (1995), and the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) project of Social 
Policy in a Development Context (2000, 2005). These initiatives have helped to reemphasize social development policies 
in developing nations and to reestablish the prominence of social development ideas among the developed nations. 
24 This has constrained its perceived relevance to the Third or developing world context and has impeded its application 
to understanding the role of social policy in promoting economic development in the developed world. I argue that the 
R E D I S C O V E R I N G  S O C I A L  I N V E S T M E N T  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T A L  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  P O L I C I E S :  






C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
17 
identify developmentalist policies in the Western industrial nations, the social development approach 
must be augmented with insights from welfare state research. I suggest that a two-track approach to 
social development, rather than a singular global model, be used that emphasizes the same 
productive logic of social policy but that recognizes the different sociopolitical contexts in which it 
is expressed (e.g., Dahl et al., 2001). 
Social development has begun to find currency with western welfare state researchers. This has been 
reflected in the increased application of conceptual tools—devised for the study of Western welfare 
states—to emerging welfare states (Gough & Wood, 2004; Holliday, 2000; Hort & Kuhnle, 2000; 
Kwon, 2005a). It also has been reflected to a lesser degree in the increased recognition of 
developmentalist elements within the industrialized welfare states, especially late industrializers 
(Dahl, Lødemel, & Drøpping, 2001; Kangas & Palme, 2005; Kurien, 2006; Vartiainen, 2002). 
Exploration of developmentalist ideas has been slowed by a major divide between the study of 
welfare states in developed countries and descriptive work on social policies in developing countries 
(Mkandawire, 2001, 2006b, 2009). A linear theory of development has contributed to a one-sided 
emphasis on economic growth as compared to social development in the Global South 
(Mkandawire, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2009). In the Global North, it has meant that the importance of 
social policy to economic development, in both the history and current context of developed 
nations, has not been systematically explored. The result has been neglect of the importance of 
social policy to economic development as an ongoing reproductive process.25 The tendency to see 
the welfare state as an end state (Therborn, 1987) has contributed to obscuring its role in 
development.26  
The application of social development to social policy, especially as it is conceived of in the welfare 
state, has been quite limited, largely because the model originated in the Global South (Midgley, 
                                                                                                                                                             
inextricability of the economic and social is a condition shared by the Global South and North, even if their social 
policies and institutions differ greatly. 
25 Among other things, the linear approach implies that democratic demands for equity cannot be a part of the 
development process (Mkandawire, 2006a). There is a tendency to equate developmental ideas with authoritarian states. 
The popular notion of the developmental state implies that development occurs first, then politics arise, and the welfare 
state emerges later. This view tends to marginalize the role of politics and the state (and social policy in particular) in 
fostering development, limiting the extent to which developmentalist ideas are applied to thinking about policies that are 
not just productive but also protective. Most developmental states seem to be poorly developed welfare states where 
social policy serves developmental (economic) goals (Gu, 2006; Kwon & Holliday, 2007). The tendency to equate 
development with entire states (as opposed to policies) or to isolate it from politics (democracy) and the welfare state, 
greatly constrains its applicability for thinking about social policies across countries. 
26 As Mkandawire (2009, p. 9) notes, ―the academic literature has misrepresented [welfare regimes] by making a 
conceptual choice that privileged protection and has missed something crucial in the ‗catch-up‘ efforts and the 
sustainability of their welfare efforts—the augmentation of their productive capacity.‖ Developmentalist elements in 
developed countries have grown less visible owing in part to both the development of a special discipline of 
development economics and the growing importance of neoclassical economics (Mkandawire, 2006a). All of the 
commonly recognized characteristics associated with developmentalism were eventually off-loaded to the developing 
world context leaving the impression that developmentalism is associated mainly with developing nations (see Kwon 
2005a). This trend was further aided by a view that in industrial countries, social policy is not intended to promote 
economic development but rather maintain income and provide support to those in need (e.g., Hall & Midgley, 2004). It 
is reasonable to assume that in addition to the perceived bifurcation of economic and social policy that is attributed to 
welfare statism by Midgley, the focus on ―planned,‖ ―purposeful,‖ and ―deliberately‖ linked economic and social policies 
has led the developmental perspective to overlook policies that may implicitly have such effects (e.g., Midgley, 1995, pp. 
51, 63, 151, 157, 170; Midgley & Tang, 2001, pp. 250–251). However, Kwon (2005a) notes that this is not the case if we 
look back on the history of industrialization. Indeed, welfare developmentalism has a long-standing history in Europe.   
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1997). Its extension to the Global North has largely occurred through the notion of welfare 
developmentalism. There are two major strands of thinking in welfare developmentalism, selective 
and inclusive (Kwon, 2005b; Riesco, 2002). The selective view focuses on social policy mainly as an 
instrument to achieving economic development; this vision predominates in developmental state 
analysis focusing on Asia (e.g., Gu, 2006; Haggard, 1990; Johnson, 1982; Stiglitz & Ury, 1996; Wade, 
1990, 1992) where state-led growth and intervention was focused on correcting conventionally 
understood market failures. The inclusive view of welfare developmentalism, which places equal 
emphasis on social and economic objectives, has been more at odds with conventional economic 
theory (in that equality was pursued alongside efficiency) as in the case of Scandinavia (Esping-
Andersen, 1992; Kuhnle & Hort, 2004; Vartiainen, 2002). 
There have been several vague attempts to categorize the features associated with the inclusive 
strand of welfare developmentalism. From the neoinstitutionalist perspective, Midgley (2003a) has 
identified three key programmatic features: an organizational framework at the national level to 
harmonize economic and social policies, the promotion of well-being through economic 
development (i.e., macroeconomic policies), and the promotion of economic development through 
productivist and social investment programs. Broadening the productivist theme, others associate 
productive welfare with characteristics such as a stronger state commitment to welfare, the view that 
all citizens should be covered by government welfare schemes, the equalization of life chances, 
social integration, democratic participation, emphasis on public investment in education, health and 
institutions to promote labor market participation along with income and social safety nets for low 
income families, comprehensive social insurance schemes, and development of active labor market 
programs (Kuhnle, 2002). Still others have summarized the key principles of inclusive welfare 
developmentalism as including productivism, social investment, and universalism (Kwon, 2005a, 
2007).27 
Critically however, inclusive developmentalist principles (i.e., productivism, social investment, and 
universalism) are programmatically vague and not clearly linked to social policies that could result in 
protective-productive outcomes. Alone, they are unable to identify the developmentalist roots of 
existing social policies in modern welfare states and lack sufficient specificity to analyze the effects of 
existing social policies. In other words, these broad programmatic themes, which imply the 
productive potential of social policy and the possibility of harmonizing social policy with economic 
development, remain generalities and contain several important ambiguities. However, it is possible 
to infuse abstract principles of inclusive developmentalism with a more coherent, cohesive, and 
policy-relevant set of principles to identify and explain the investment-oriented effects of existing 
social policies. 
A more thorough exploration of Midgley‘s perspective illustrates the ambiguity of social 
development with respect to social policy. Specifically, Midgley‘s work serves both to clarify the 
                                                 
27 Kwon (2007) identified the key principles of the selective strand of welfare developmentalism as productivism, 
selective social investment, and authoritarianism, as opposed to inclusive welfare developmentalism, which is based on 
productivism, universal social investment, and democratic governance. Productivism is used interchangeably in both 
strands of developmentalism in Kwon‘s definition. From the perspective of the dissertation, productivism—as applied in 
the selective version—implies the subordination of social policy to economic policy, whereas productivism—as applied 
in the inclusive version—suggests the integration (i.e., interdependence) of economic and social policies, where social 
policy and equality are necessary preconditions for economic efficiency. The notion of productivism—as applied in the 
inclusive developmental approach—shares roots with Myrdal‘s (1968) view of redistribution as a prerequisite for growth, 
as opposed to the treatments of productivism from the perspective of subordination (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2004, 2005). 
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limits of social development and illuminate its explanatory potential when combined with broader 
developmentalist insights and ideas from comparative research. Midgley‘s neoinstitutionalism, which 
is firmly in the inclusive welfare developmentalism tradition, has been overly ambitious as a ―third 
model of social welfare‖ (Midgley, 1995, p. 25) that transcends the residual-institutional approaches 
that have dominated social welfare thinking (i.e., welfare statism and social administration). While 
Midgley relates social development to aspects of institutionalism, he is generally critical of 
institutionalism insofar as he accepts that it rests on a tradition that bifurcates economic and social 
policy.28 As a result of this tendency to throw out the baby with the bathwater and a general 
skepticism about the comparative approach to social policy in the Global North, there has been little 
interest in revisiting and reexamining existing institutionalist social policies in order to discern 
whether or not they have a developmentalist orientation (e.g., Midgley, 2004). The focus has been on 
advocating a variety of relatively new and innovative policies ranging from asset accumulation to 
developing microenterprises (Midgley, 1995, 1997, 1999) rather than creating a robust theoretical 
framework for thinking systematically about the types of social policies that may contribute to 
economic development across countries. A challenge for social development is to decipher and 
theoretically recover the developmental aspects of social policy in the Global North using the policy 
language that prevails in the welfare state literature. 
Taking Midgley as a leading exponent of the social development approach (and inclusive strand of 
welfare developmentalism), one can identify three central limitations vis-à-vis existing social policy that 
have inhibited the application of developmentalist ideas to the welfare state. The first, related to 
productivism, deals with the way in which social and economic policy is integrated. The second, 
related to social investment, deals with the extent to which all social expenditures have potential 
benefits. The third, related to universalism, pertains to the way that policies interact. Drawing on 
central insights from the unified socioeconomic planning approach of Myrdal (i.e., how welfare 
systems provide reproductive factors) and the welfare statist perspective (i.e., offering a lexicon for 
classifying comparative social policy), we can address these limitations and clarify thinking on the 
types of social policy in the Global North that may be both productive and protective. 
There is a desire in social development to integrate economic and social policy considerations or to 
promote the overall well-being of society in conjunction with an ongoing process of economic 
development (Midgley, 1995). However, this view implies that the economic and social can exist 
separately from one another, the social needs to be integrated within the economic, and economic 
development is possible without social policy. As Midgley and Tang (2001, p. 247) write, 
―developmental welfare requires a strong role for the state, not only in social welfare but in 
promoting economic development as well.‖ This type of language reflects ambiguity regarding the 
precise relationship between social welfare and economic development, and suggests an inherent 
separation between the two. While social development seems to imply a more integral role for social 
policy, it only explicitly asserts that social development cannot take place without economic 
development and ―that economic development is meaningless if it fails to bring about improvements 
                                                 
28 Midgley (2003a) characterizes institutionalism as the dominant approach to social policy during the golden age of the 
welfare state based on national Keynesian economic policies, redistributive social policy, and moral and altruistic appeals 
for a just and caring society (Titmuss, 1958, 1968, 1971, 1974). Arguably, expressions of social development ideas have 
been present in developed countries throughout the institutional period. In other words, it is not so much that social 
welfare and economic development have not been linked (as emphasized in inclusive welfare developmentalism) but that 
their implicit link has not been recognized or understood. Moreover, it is unclear how the developmentalist ―macro-
perspective on social policy‖ (Midgley, 2003a, p. 8) would translate into actual existing welfare state policies. 
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in well-being‖ (Midgley & Tang, 2001, p. 246). It clearly suggests that ―retrenchment in social 
welfare will impede economic development‖ (Midgley & Tang, 2001, p. 246), primarily because 
social welfare includes investments that make economic development possible. However, it does not 
explain in detail which social expenditure policies constitute social investments or are indispensable to 
economic performance. This view moves beyond bifurcation yet implies that it is possible to have 
strictly nonproductive maintenance-based social programs that have an unrecoverable depleting 
effect on finite resources (Midgley, 1997) in contrast to the possibility that existing policies may 
simultaneously have positive economic and social implications. 
Social development supports the notion that social expenditures in the form of social investments 
contribute positively to economic development. However, there is an unclear, contradictory view of 
the value of social expenditures in general. While social expenditures on ―social service policies and 
programmes that are investment oriented and promote economic development‖ are emphasized 
(Midgley & Tang, 2001, p. 246), social development is sometimes juxtaposed with the ―provision of 
social services, the payment of social benefits, and the intervention of professional personnel‖ 
(Midgley & Tang, 2001, p. 246). Some argue that welfare policies have focused excessively on the 
provision of benefits and that ―social development favors instead programs that are investment 
oriented and contribute to economic growth‖ (Midgley & Tang, p. 247). The ambiguous view of 
social benefits is confusing as it implies that social benefits are problematic in that they contradict 
the investment orientation of social development and simultaneously are helpful in that they 
contribute to economic growth. While reference is made to the need for remedial and maintenance 
oriented social services (Midgley & Tang, 2001), universalism is also invoked (Midgley, 1999). Thus, 
there is no systematic identification of appropriate social policies or attempt to apply existing benefit 
categories that correspond to the welfare state literature.   
Finally, related to the preceding two points, social development tends to not see policies as 
cumulative and interactive, instead applying broad brush strokes when it comes to the institutional 
welfare model and terms such as entitlement rights (Midgley, 2000).29 For instance, social development 
places little emphasis on entitlement rights and seems to associate them with altruism (Midgley, 
2003a; Midgley & Tang, 2001) rather than distinguishing the possible productive importance of 
entitlements in certain areas and in combination with other types of benefits. Developmental policy 
effects may be the result of different policy interactions (or contingent upon these interactions) as 
opposed to being associated entirely with developmental state regimes or even individual policies.30 
Rather than identifying how productivism and social investment may be present in current welfare 
state policy, the social development approach seems to assume such policy does not exist but that it 
can be implemented through human capital, employment/self-employment programs, social capital, 
asset development, and removing barriers to economic participation.  
Midgley‘s notion of social development is limited in helping us understand the potentially productive 
effects of social policy in the Global North. It is difficult to move beyond the conclusion that 
                                                 
29 This skeptical view of the income-based welfare state with its often large-scale, consumption-oriented spending 
(especially for the nonpoor) appears to be broadly shared in the various capital or asset-holdings approaches (Haveman, 
1988; Sawhill, 1989; Sherraden, 1991) (see also Sherraden & Page-Adams, 1995).  
30 Midgley (1999, p. 9) notes that social development programs, while often discussed discretely, ―can obviously be 
combined to create a comprehensive strategy for promoting social welfare.‖ However, there appears to be no 
accommodation in social development for the possibility that what would be considered merely consumption (when 
provided alone) would, when combined with other types of provisions, reflect an investment. This possibility is of 
course fundamental in Myrdal‘s (1974) notion of cumulative causation. 
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consumption-based income transfers do not entail investments than can enhance capabilities 
(Midgley 2003a; Midgley & Tang, 2001b) or that ―redistributive social welfare expends scarce 
resources on unproductive social services, maintains needy people in dependency, and stifles 
economic growth‖ (Midgley, 1999, p. 3). The principles of productivism, social investment, and 
universalism lack a clear theoretical exposition of (1) how economic and social policy are 
interconnected, (2) the efficacy of social benefits (and investment potential of consumption 
expenditures), and (3) the way in which social policies may be synergistically related. As a result, 
social development as currently conceptualized cannot identify the developmentalist roots of existing 
social policies in western welfare states. 
Welfare developmentalism can make a more robust contribution to understanding protective-
productive social policy if social development is thought of in less comprehensive terms. Rather 
than pursuing a global social policy approach that aspires to encompass both the developing and 
developed worlds, a two-track approach that recognizes the different sociopolitical contexts of the 
Global North and the Global South—while challenging neoliberal orthodoxy in both cases—is 
preferable. The comprehensive approach tends to implicate research in the Global North as 
neglecting the Global South and holds traditional welfare state policies at arm‘s length. This 
overlooks important differences in the feasibility of state intervention and the value of not only 
poverty reduction but also poverty prevention. There is nothing inherent in social development that links it 
to improvement of welfare for the poor in contexts in which poverty prevention may be as 
important as poverty reduction (ESCWA, 2003; Kuhnle & Hort, 2004). Further, it overlooks the 
central developmentalist premise shared by both developing and developed countries. This is the 
view articulated by Myrdal (1974, p. 732) and on which I argue that the new critical perspective of social 
development should be built: 
Well-planned redistributional reforms…can be productive by raising the 
quality of the labor force and/or by saving individuals and society from 
future costs. This holds true for even those rich countries which already have 
raised substantially the level of living of their least affluent strata.31 
A two-track approach to social development, based on this fundamental premise, can be used not 
only to inform development from the bottom up (i.e., contesting the mainstream orthodoxy 
imposed on developing countries) but also to understand how social policy may contribute to 
development from the top down (i.e., where there is also a role for challenging mainstream 
orthodoxy). This approach recognizes that while the theory associated with welfare state regime or 
typological thinking may not be sufficient for informing practical policy in developing nations 
(Midgley, 1997), social development can nevertheless be useful for understanding how economic 
development and social policy is functionally harmonized in the Global North. In this sense, 
developmentalist ideas remain applicable to developed nations. This dualistic approach to thinking 
about social development opens the door to considering how the insights of welfare state research 
can inform welfare developmentalism and contribute to more systematic expectations about 
comparable types of social policy. Building on Myrdal‘s premise, it is possible to combine the 
insights of social development with those of welfare state research. Their complimentary insights 
enable us to move beyond generic developmentalist principles that are programmatically vague to 
                                                 
31 While this premise recognizes differences between developing and developed countries, it strongly implies that 
development is an ongoing process that must be reproduced, as opposed to being an end state. This premise has roots in 
the classical economic tradition of Oskar Lange among others. Refer to Myrdal (1973, 1974) (see also Hort, 1993). 
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more specific policy-relevant principles for thinking about developmental welfare and social policies 
together. 
Midgley (2003a) correctly asserts that Titmuss, Marshall, and other theorists using the 
representational approach separated the economic and social domains. However, Midgley‘s (1999, p. 
9) critique of the ―compartmentalization of social welfare and economic development‖ in welfare 
statism has led to the assumption that welfare state conceptualizations of effort are incapable of 
accounting for the productive effects of social policy. This mistakes the theoretical neglect of 
productive social policy with the absence of productive social policy. Discarding important aspects 
of the representational approach, it is mistakenly concluded that social expenditures in the form of 
consumption or maintenance are discrete from investment expenditures. Despite this limitation, the 
central contribution of developmentalism to welfare state thinking is the addition of productive 
outcomes to the traditional preoccupation with protective outcomes.  
The welfare statist approach, while offering a lexicon for considering the types of policies that might 
constitute social investments, has not focused on productive outcomes. Consider Brigg‘s (1961) 
programmatic definition of the welfare state. He suggests that welfare states have three goals: (1) 
economic security (i.e., protecting citizens from common life risks by replacing lost income), (2) 
material sufficiency (i.e., providing a basic floor of social protection), and (3) basic services (ensuring 
access to critical goods and services). These goals correspond to three policy categories: (1) social 
security (i.e., insurance), (2) public assistance, and (3) services. In the traditional welfare state view 
focused on redistribution, it is not clear what is meant by the terms sufficiency or critical goods and 
services. What is the difference between minimal and adequate, and to what does the term critical refer? 
A similar point can be made with respect to Esping-Andersen (2000d, pp. 161, 163), who 
distinguishes ―minimal needs‖ from a ―luxurious second-tier, universally inclusive, earnings-related 
insurance scheme on top of the flat-rate egalitarian one‖ geared to the ―discriminating tastes of the 
new middle classes.‖ It is not clear why or how, in policy terms, principles such as universalism and 
decommodification extended to the new middle classes ―minimize social problems and maximize 
revenue income‖ (Esping-Andersen, 2000d, p. 163). 
Myrdal‘s version of welfare developmentalism emphasizes prevention and the internalization of 
externalized social costs in the economy (e.g., Pigou, 1929), where social organization or 
coordination is a prerequisite to economic efficiency (Stiglitz, 1996; Vartiainen, 2002). Social policy 
is a means of economic efficiency insofar as inequality, insecurity, and social risk entail costs 
(Esping-Andersen, 1985) and underutilized resources. Welfare systems are seen as preconditions for 
economic development and growth, providing economic systems with the productive factors that 
they require (Tomassi, 2005). Growth depends on and translates into human development, and 
human development depends on and translates into growth, ad infinitum (Ranis & Stewart, 2005). 
Implicit in this view is the idea that the individual citizen and household is not a self-contained 
source of development but that individual ability is developed with assistance from outside.32 The 
idea of human development relates to the notions of capability, endowments, opportunities, assets, 
and the like and implies that well-being is multidimensional. It also emphasizes building human 
capabilities, not simply income or expenditures. As such, it holds potentially extensive implications 
for policies and programs, suggesting that efforts to increase capabilities as well as efforts to 
improve opportunities are important.   
                                                 
32 Indeed, as Titmuss (1958, p. 44) observes, ―as man becomes more individual and more specialized he becomes more 
socially dependent.‖ 
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It supports a view that one cannot dichotomize social policies as either investments or costs in and 
of themselves. Policies may simultaneously have investment and consumption aspects (Esping-
Andersen, 2002, 2003) whose effects may vary in combination (i.e., cumulatively or 
interdependently) with other policies. Developmentalism suggests a need to take into account the 
potentially synergistic nature of policies and recognize that policies must be considered in terms of 
the way they interact, not discretely. Economic performance and efficiency do not come exclusively 
from cutting costs but rather expanding investments (Andersson, 2005). For instance, if social risks 
entail associated costs and social investments are synergistic, perhaps this argues against selective 
assistance to those in need and in favor of preventing need. Further, rather than arguing against 
entitlements on the basis that they simply reflect passive consumption, it may be that this short-term 
consumption also reflects a long-term investment. A policy-relevant interpretation of welfare 
developmentalism suggests that the economic and social are often fundamentally related in the same 
policy, expenditures, and benefits of various sorts are not inherently at odds with social investment, 
and developmentalist policy is interactive and synergistic. What does this view of welfare 
developmentalism suggest about the nature and beneficiaries of developmentalist policies? 
Midgley (1999) offers examples of what productive social development programs should focus on, 
including cost effectiveness, human capital investments, social capital formation, individual and 
community assets, economic participation through productive employment and self-employment, 
removal of barriers to economic participation, and the creation of a social climate conducive to 
development (e.g., Midgley, 2001; Midgley, 2003a; Midgley & Tang, 2001). Related work is 
suggestive of when and for whom social policies should be focused. It may be especially important to 
target benefits to key groups of people at critical periods of time. For example, Esping-Andersen 
(2002, 2005) identifies three vulnerable groups: (1) children and their families, (2) those in the midst 
of work life, who may experience tensions between family life and paid work, and (3) the elderly. 
Relatedly, new and stochastic risks complicate traditional actuarial insurance (Esping-Andersen, 
2000b; Hacker, 2008; Newman, 2008; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Vandecasteele, 2011).33 Finally, with 
respect to how investments should be made, Gough (2000, 2001b) suggests that there are tradeoffs 
and constraints involved in welfare state effort and effects and contends, for example, that programs 
need to be directed at improving the supply of capital and/or labor rather than merely providing 
resources to some in need. 
Based on the revised view of social development adapted from Midgley, the central premise of 
Myrdal‘s unified socioeconomic planning approach, and insights from the welfare statist/social 
administration approach, I propose several policy-relevant developmentalist principles that are 
suggestive of the type of social policies that are likely to yield both productive and protective 
outcomes. While these principles remain somewhat vague at this stage of theoretical development, 
their implications become more precise when applied to thinking about major social policy 
categories in developed welfare states. These principles include the following:   
 
                                                 
33 In particular, intergenerational risks (i.e., risks transmitted from parents to children) are difficult to deal with. Esping-
Andersen (2000b, p. 4) writes: ―In conventional social policy thought, unpredictable and stochastic risks have been 
relegated to (often ad hoc) social assistance programmes. The sharp rise in social assistance caseloads almost everywhere 
in developed countries mirrors the declining efficacy of the conventional insurance approach.‖ He adds that the risk 
view tends to individualize welfare issues, as opposed to recognizing welfare interplays. The Cross-National Research on 
the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage (CRITA) project is one attempt being led by Tim Smeeding to explore 
the issue. 
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 Adequacy of provision to ensure high quality  
 Prevention of future social costs as part of a long-term perspective 
 Activation that reduces disincentives and maximizes the ability to earn and incentives to earn 
 Access to goods and services 
 Maximization of the utilization of resources 
 Guaranteed consumption of developmentally beneficial goods and services 
 Entitlement based on relationship to economic development (not solely need, contribution, 
or citizenship)  
 Inclusiveness based on increasingly stochastic risk/instability 
The remaining section draws on commonly shared policy metrics from crossnational welfare state 
research to speculate about the types of policies that most closely express these principles. 
Transferring themes into welfare state policies and predictions 
One way to translate social developmentalist ideas into the welfare state policy lexicon is to conceive 
of them in terms of their qualitative aspects, including mode of delivery (e.g., in-kind or cash), 
benefit eligibility requirements (i.e., whether a program is means-tested or universal), quantitative 
aspects (e.g., expenditure level, replacement rates), and focus (e.g., function and demographic 
constituency). I have focused on selected aspects, including the overall expenditures, type of 
expenditures, and policy areas. A full complement of DWSP dimensions might include not only 
overall level of social expenditure, type of expenditure, and policy area but also factors like tax, 
financing and contributory structure, eligibility, coverage and replacement rate, or other institutional 
characteristics (e.g., occupational, fiscal, and other regulatory issues) (Titmuss, 1958). I attempted a 
preliminary formulation of developmentalist expectations solely in the area of welfare state social 
policies and so do not attempt to integrate additional factors that may well bear on the impact of 
DWSPs. My formulation is concerned with the benefit and not tax side.34 In any case, as Kanbur 
(2006) has suggested, attempts to distinguish social policy from economic policy objectives are not 
very successful nor is the effort to classify policy instruments into one or the other.  
DWSP simply suggests that in terms of predicting developmentalist outcomes, factors such as level 
of expenditure, means of delivery, nature of targeting, and the like may be combined in ways that 
can be expected to be associated with low levels of development-inhibiting poverty and high levels 
of economic activity. Furthermore, it suggests that it should be possible to begin to assess the 
relative importance of various aspects of policy (i.e., the value-added impact of variations in these 
different policy combinations, their magnitude, and the way that they interact). 
The notion that social policy does more than transfer or redistribute income suggests that there are 
different ways to think about what policy delivers and how it does so. The core principles of 
developmentalism (summarized on the left side of Figure 1 below) emphasize certain characteristics 
likely to be associated with outcomes that are both protective and productive. The figure 
demonstrates how these core developmentalist principles can be translated into features of 
                                                 
34 While tax-based social welfare may interfere with incentives to work, which was not directly examined in my original 
dissertation, universal benefits may turn out to blunt any distortionary effects associated with tax-financed social 
transfers because of the way they impact incentives to work for those being taxed and those receiving benefits. Just as 
there may be positive synergistic effects to social policy, many distortions may cancel each other out. The dissertation 
was at best a very partial exploration of whether the efficiency grounds for social policies dominate the costs of market 
distortions (e.g., Hausman, 2008; van der Ploeg, 2005). 
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developmentalist policy. These policy-relevant principles can be translated into DWSPs. I define 
these as relatively high expenditures on in-kind, universal, family-focused, and active labor market 
benefits. 


















Developmentalist principles Developmentalist welfare state policies 
Adequacy of provision 
to ensure high quality 
Prevention of future 
social costs as part of a 
long-term perspective 
Activation that reduces 
disincentives and maximizes 
the ability/incentives to earn 
Access to goods and 
services 
Maximization of the 
utilization of resources 
Guaranteed consumption of 
developmentally beneficial 
goods and services 
Entitlement based on 
relationship to economic 
development (not need, 
contribution, or citizenship) 












Health and early 
education 
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―Adequacy of provision to ensure high quality‖ suggests that DWSPs should be generous (i.e., that 
the proportion of GDP spent on social expenditures should be relatively high), because only with 
generous policies can there be an increased likelihood of both quality and coverage. ―Prevention of 
future social costs as part of a long-term perspective‖ suggests that expenditures on family policy, 
especially policies that improve family functioning when children are young, are likely to yield 
greater returns over the long-term than policies directed at amelioration of problems after their 
onset. ―Activation that reduces disincentives and maximizes the ability/incentives to earn‖ argues in 
favor of family policies that enable market participation (e.g., provision of child care or assistance 
with purchasing it) and a set of policies typically called active labor market policies (ALMPs), which 
relies on incentives as opposed to sanctions to encourage employment. ―Access to goods and 
services,‖ especially those that guarantee future capability, suggests that in-kind benefits are more 
likely to ensure positive returns than cash benefits. ―Maximization of the utilization of resources‖ 
also argues in favor of in-kind benefits. If in-kind benefits are seen as being of high quality, they are 
likely to result in high benefit uptake. Relatedly, ―guaranteed consumption of developmentally 
beneficial goods and services‖ argues in favor of both in-kind and universal benefits. The universal 
concept should guarantee access, which should lead to increased consumption, while in-kind 
provision can ensure consumption of developmentally beneficial goods in a way that cash benefits 
cannot. ―Entitlement based on relationship to economic development (not need, contribution, or 
citizenship)‖ argues in favor of universal benefits and suggests there are resources that bear such a 
strong relationship to economic development that they should not be based on income or status. 
Note that this principle does allow for benefits being available only for those who fit particular 
categories, if those categories are related to economic development.35 ―Inclusiveness based on 
increasingly stochastic risk/instability‖ also argues in favor of universal benefits on the grounds that 
in addition to the traditional risk factors for poverty, increased uncertainty or unpredictability across 
the life course relative to earlier historical periods (Bonoli, 2007; Hacker, 2008; Newman, 2008; 
Vandecasteele, 2011) makes insurance more cost-effective and suggests that in order to prevent 
problems, individuals should not have to already be low-income before being entitled to benefits. 
All in all, the policies suggested by developmentalist principles include a greater emphasis on in-kind 
and universal transfers, high overall levels of social expenditures, and families, children, and active 
labor market policy. One would expect to see minimal means testing in developmentally essential 
areas, policies that are nonstigmatizing and ensure uptake and access and incentives and indicator 
targeting as opposed to sanctions and minimalist transfers, which may be harmful to others (e.g., 
dependents) in a developmentalist sense.36 
                                                 
35 Rather than being based on conventional social insurance programs, citizens should be entitled to a range of benefits 
not simply because they are citizens (again, see Johnson [2014a] for discussion of T. H. Marshall) but rather because 
many citizenship-based entitlements arguably have positive economic consequences by virtue of addressing nonactuarial 
and interrelated risks (interrelated in that prevention of costs and maximization of resources requires multiple 
investments). In other words, the provision of basic goods for all citizens is assumed to be effective because a wide 
range of social conditions may have economic consequences due to the coefficient of interrelation and the likelihood 
that many social conditions have economic consequences. 
36 The social development perspective would seem to imply an ―indicator-targeting or back-to-Beveridge approach‖ 
(Barr, 1998, pp. 267–269). Whereas the neoclassical view would support income testing through negative income taxes 
(though limited as concerned with poverty trap), indicator targeting would suggest that making benefits conditional on 
other characteristics is less likely to entail efficiency costs and more likely to prevent poverty. Ideal indicators are highly 
correlated with poverty and exogenous to the individual (e.g., illness, old age, infancy, and—more controversially—
unemployment) (see also Kahn and Kamerman [1987] for more on factors that put families at risk of poverty). In reality, 
as Barr suggests, some combination of these approaches (e.g., a small-scale negative income tax and categorical scheme) 
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In DWSPs, some benefits are conditional on work but also reflect an active state role in 
redistributing assets or endowments, equalizing opportunity and providing universal services across 
the life cycle. The empirical challenge lies in determining whether there is an optimal combination of 
these policies with regard to who should be targeted to receive what universal services and which 
opportunities should be equalized and endowments redistributed, for instance. My theoretical 
assertion is that there can be something about DWSPs that constitutes a productive investment and 
entails minimal direct economic costs, and that crossnational comparative studies may be a useful 
device in ascertaining unintended effects or the absence of effects of different social policies. In the 
final section of this paper, I briefly clarify the key economic underpinning observations that underlie 
DWSPs. In differentiating mainstream economics from developmental predictions, several 
fundamental limitations of the mainstream approach to understanding possible social policy effects 
are discussed. The economic logic of DWSPs rests on a number of assumptions that substantially 
differ from those of standard economic theory. 
Welfare developmentalism suggests that policies are multifunctional (i.e., interactive and cumulative) 
and simultaneously investment and consumption oriented (i.e., synergistic) (Delamonica & Mehrotra, 
2006, 2009; Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2006). For example, policies that improve nutrition also will 
improve learning, and improvements in learning may also improve nutrition. Similarly, policies that 
increase education also may contribute to the development of infrastructure that can improve on the 
investment climate, which may further encourage investments in education and other skills 
(Fouarge, 2003).37 Social outlays can be productive social investments that yield dividends if it is 
recognized that a range of factors, such as family conditions, mediate the effects of these 
investments (Karoly, 2000; Tham, 2001).38 DWSPs are not necessarily active or passive and 
                                                                                                                                                             
are likely to be optimal because they are complementary (Atkinson, 1995b, c). The increasing prevalence of stochastic 
and uncertain (or less predictable) risks underlies the value of policies that focus on the conditions (beyond individuals‘ 
control) that affect an increasingly broad array of people (across the life course and intergenerationally) and ultimately 
undergirds the rationale for universal indicator-targeted policies. It may be harder to target insurance at narrowly defined 
high-risk groups when risks are less discrete and predictable. 
37 A fundamental assumption of synergy is that ―in strategies where one type of intervention is absent, the effect of the 
interventions in the other spheres is less than it would have otherwise been‖ (Delamonica & Mehrotra, 2006, p. 7). 
Synergy resembles the notion of cumulative causation pioneered by early development economists (Hirschman, 1958; 
Kaldor, 1972; Myrdal, 1957; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Young, 1928) (see also Toner, 1999) in which reinforcing 
mechanisms and feedback (e.g., interdependent investments) affect the dynamics of development of an economy. 
Models of circular and cumulative causation, such as that of economic surplus, differ significantly from the neoclassical 
tradition (Myrdal, 1974). One reason is that cumulative causation models identify positive/negative feedback 
mechanisms and emphasize the endogeneity of factors such as resource endowments considered exogenous in the 
neoclassical models. Out-of-equilibrium positions are the norm and involve increasing returns, capital 
complementarities, and coordinated investment (Mathews, 2005; Murphy et al., 1989; Roberts & Cohen, 2002). 
38 Consider the area of family support and the interaction of cash child benefits and public in-kind childcare benefits 
(Kangas & Palme, 2000). Developmentalism suggests that cash expenditure, absent access to adequate care, or in the 
absence of other related benefits, may yield less effective outcomes. Similarly, unemployment insurance (UI) may not be 
simply a wage paid by the state when a person is not working. When combined with other benefits, UI may have a 
preventive aspect beyond income maintenance. In addition to how costly it is for a head of household to remain 
unemployed, there are potential benefits of risk taking, allowing for a more effective job search and eventual fit, 
investments in training, and the protection of dependents. Studies have emphasized a variety of benefits of UI payments 
ranging from preventing housing delinquencies and foreclosures (e.g., Emsellem et al., 2008) to positively impacting 
well-being (Sjöberg, 2010). Such benefits may be viewed as a collective resource with important external benefits (above 
and beyond those to the unemployed who directly utilize such benefits). For an example of research that illustrates the 
potential effects of upstream factors (e.g., changes in social and economic policies) on previously unanticipated 
outcomes (e.g., health), see Herd et al. (2008). 
R E D I S C O V E R I N G  S O C I A L  I N V E S T M E N T  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T A L  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  P O L I C I E S :  






C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
28 
investment- or maintenance-oriented on their own. Their effects are anticipated to occur as a result 
of the combination of social policies. 
The central idea is that 1 + 1 is not always equal to 2 but may in fact be something else greater than 
2. Policies may have both a discrete impact on poverty and labor market outcomes and a combined 
nonadditive, nonlinear impact that is greater for both aspects together than each separately. For 
instance, cash transfers may be more likely to generate moral hazard when means tested or when 
overall expenditure is high, while moral hazard may be lessened if the program is universal or if 
expenditure levels are low. Alternatively, the total amount spent on in-kind benefits may not be as 
salient as the relative proportion of in-kind to universal benefits and where they are invested. 
Combining cash benefits with means-tested benefits may result in lower uptake in developmentally 
important areas. Reasons for low uptake include a lack of knowledge among potentially eligible 
people, reluctance to accept what may be perceived as charity, and the complex administrative 
procedures involved (Pestieau, 2006). If different benefits have different uptake or consumption 
characteristics, there may be costs associated with gaps in coverage or lost benefits attached to 
forgone future productivity. In this sense, certain populations may be more likely to benefit from in-
kind benefits than others. 
There are several interactive effects that may be particularly important from a developmental 
perspective. Just as the lowest rates of posttax/transfer poverty should be correlated with individual 
DWSPs, these policies are expected to positively interact. Of central interest is the interaction 
between in-kind and universal benefits. They are expected to have a stronger antipoverty effect 
together than either variable alone. The reason for suspecting this interaction is that they are 
believed to collectively have a stronger impact of guaranteeing consumption of resources that are 
inversely related to poverty (especially costly poverty) while minimizing distortions. Of course, there 
could also be three-way interactions among policy variables. For instance, the negative effect of 
social expenditure on market poverty might be higher when combined with universal and in-kind 
benefits than alone. 
The assertion that distribution and production are interrelated and that the former may positively 
impact the latter suggests that policy should be concerned about distributing more than income (e.g., 
forms of capital such as health, adaptability through education and training, perceived mobility, 
opportunity via low inequality [e.g., Kaufmann, 2007], and the like). As suggested earlier, transfers 
involve not only income, resources, or commodities but also, if implicitly, wider capabilities, access, 
etc. in terms of the means by which they are delivered. It also suggests a focus on prevention. The 
conventional economic approach does not necessarily support these implications. Below, I briefly 
contrast assumptions of the standard economic approach with the social developmental approach 
and the types of policies each approach would support. I clarify the key economic underpinning 
observations that underlie DWSPs. (Refer to Johnson [2010] for a more extensive discussion of the 
economic logic of DWSPs.) 
The Economic Logic and Predictions of DWSPs 
I have argued that we need to explain the paradoxical occurrences of countries that achieve low 
poverty, relatively high economic performance, and relatively high levels of government 
expenditures. I concluded that we need a new theoretical framework for thinking about social 
policies that may be both protective and productive. I then proposed a notion of welfare 
developmentalism to explain the types of policies that may be responsible for these protective-
productive outcomes. Based on a set of developmentalist principles these policies were referred to as 
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DWSPs, which emphasized in-kind and universal transfers, higher overall levels of expenditure than 
economic logic would suggest is beneficial, and a focus on family policy and ALMPs. The predicted 
effects of these types of policies are broadly at odds with mainstream economic theory. Here I 
briefly compare the logic and relevant assumptions of the mainstream economic view with the 
developmentalist view. While I cannot review mainstream economic perspectives on the welfare 
state or specific policies in detail in this paper, I briefly clarify the limitations of the second-best 
theory and market failure explanations, and propose several hypotheses about the consequences of 
DWSPs. 
With respect to the political economic logic of DWSPs, a substantial contrast can be drawn between 
welfare developmentalism and the standard economic view. Recognizing diversity among 
economists, welfare developmentalism is contrasted with the standard view with respect to 
embedded values, central assumptions, and policy implications.39 To more fully understand the 
economic logic of DWSPs, it is important to appreciate the economic observations or assertions that 
are associated with developmentalist principles and the ways in which these differ from the standard 
economic perspective.40 This is valuable because it can help clarify the theoretical basis for the 
distinctive predictions offered by welfare developmentalism relative to the mainstream view, offering 
a plausible explanation for the empirical results and a basis for future research. Further, owing to the 
nascent character of this conceptual framework, identifying the economic concepts on which it is 
based can lend deeper theoretical coherence to welfare developmentalism by grounding it in 
established economic ideas and traditions and can pave the way for further theoretical development.  
Table 2. Situating Welfare Developmentalism in Economic Thought: Summarizing Differences 
 Standard economic view Welfare developmentalism 
Value approach  
Normative 
status 
Rooted in the positive economic 
perspective. Little can be said about 
the fairness of allocation. Market-
based allocation is generally seen as 
optimal. 
Rooted in the normative economic 
tradition in that it is focused on how 
resources should be allocated. Market-
based allocation is typically suboptimal 
and needs to be supplemented. 
  
                                                 
39 I follow the contingency-based view of social protection and economic efficiency (Gough, 1996; Tomassi, 2005) (see 
also Karelis, 2007; Pasinetti, 2007; Pressman, 2005 on the limitations of economic laws) and more broadly the spirit of 
the heterodox economic tradition. The later reflects the effort to restore realism and complexity in economics (e.g., 
Fullbrook, 2004, 2006, 2008; Harvey & Garnett, 2008; Keen, 2001; Lawson, 2006), which reflects a return to classical 
notions of political economy where the contingent nature of economic laws as well as people‘s preferences is recognized, 
and the constructedness (Polanyi, 1944) and self-fulfilling (Merton, 1949) or performative nature of economics 
(MacKenzie et al., 2007) is acknowledged. There are at least two main reasons that it is difficult to understand the 
economic implications of social policy and in particular to discover interdependencies and synergies across policies. The 
first is the piecemeal and pragmatic way in which public policy is made. The second is that microeconomic policy 
analysis is constrained by the tendency to focus on specific polices and problems. See Johnson (2010, pp. 70–71, 
footnote 61) for further discussion. 
40 It is important to recognize that in considering ongoing changes throughout economics, there is some dispute about 
whether there is still a mainstream and whether that can be described as neoclassical. Davis (2006) suggests that 
neoclassical perspectives no longer dominate and that there is no longer a unified mainstream view but an increasingly 
diverse set of perspectives. However, neoclassical perspectives still arguably dominate instruction and are the primary 
focus in public policy (Lefeber & Vietorisz, 2007).  
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The private market typically delivers 
efficiency. Failures are typically seen 
as discrete, isolated, and limited (i.e., 
not interrelated). The scope for 
information failure is limited.  
Market failures are seen as widespread 
and interrelated. A broad notion of 





Markets are generally efficient and 
resources utilized. The focus is on 
exchange. There is a strong 
separation between production and 
consumption. 
Market distributions are not necessarily 
efficient, and underutilization of 
resources occurs. The focus is on 
production. Production can be 
increased by reducing social costs (i.e., 
increasing social investments). In this 
way, production and later consumption 






Not enough is known to justify large 
scale interventions. Only a residual 
welfare state is justified. The 
emphasis is on the risk of 
government failure in terms of 
information limitations and 
economic distortions. 
Enough is known to justify large scale 
interventions. A universal or 
institutional welfare state is justified. 
The emphasis is on how government, 
through social policy, can contain 




Redistribution is problematic, 
interfering with market outcomes, 
which are typically optimal. Focus is 
on remediating severe poverty, to the 
extent that transfers are permitted. 
Redistribution may increase efficiency, 
especially if it increases capacities. 




Emphasizes selective intervention 
based on cash and modest overall 
social expenditure. Preferred 
approach to means testing, ALMP, 
and family policy less clear. 
Emphasizes systemic intervention 
based on in-kind, universal, and 
generous overall social expenditure. 
ALMP and family policy should be 
particularly beneficial. 
  
With respect to the value approach, key differences center on the role of distribution beyond Pareto 
optimality, sympathy toward an objective basis of value, and belief that the high cost of poverty 
suggests an increase in net income may result from poverty prevention. In the mainstream view, 
economists are quite skeptical of their ability to make normative statements, especially about the 
distribution of resources. The focus is primarily on describing economic interactions, especially 
describing how resources would be allocated if underlying assumptions were realized. Goods and 
services generally are not seen as having value in and of themselves but only in exchange. So in the 
mainstream view, there is little room for identifying particular items as good and judging a society 
based on how that item is distributed. To the extent that the mainstream view discusses the 
distribution of income or goods, the key concept is Pareto optimality. Pareto efficiency says nothing 
about how good the income distribution is (Arkhiiereiev & Schwodiauer, 2008; Koning & Jongeneel, 
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1997). The mainstream view focuses on economic efficiency and the size of the pie and generally 
ignores income distribution (i.e., dividing up the pie), seeing this as a more normative issue. 
In contrast, the developmentalist view is built on an older economics tradition that is more willing to 
place value on certain goods and has more emphasis on how resources should be allocated. It is less 
hesitant about considering normative arguments. The tradition dates back to the work of Pigou 
(1920, 1952), which linked optimality conditions to the distribution of income and is connected to 
the Material Welfare School or ―old welfare economics‖ (Gagnier, 2000, p. 49). Developmentalism 
could be interpreted as implying a critique of the subjective theory of value and as being sympathetic 
toward a more objective basis for determining value. Whereas subjective valuation tends to support 
individuals‘ choice of the price they wish to pay for goods or services, developmentalism supports a 
notion that some goods and services have value to society beyond what individuals may be likely to 
pay.41 
Developmentalism makes a strong critique of mainstream theory by raising the possibility that the 
way certain goods and services are distributed can affect the size of the pie in the future. For 
example, a distributional system that leads to extreme poverty may stunt children‘s cognitive and 
emotional development with long-term harmful consequences for their education and acquisition of 
skills. Thus, this unequal distribution could result in a lack of economic competitiveness in the long 
term (Gough, 1994, 1996). Developmentalism suggests that social ills have significant costs. 
Specifically, it suggests that there are many costs associated with poverty and therefore benefits to its 
prevention (see Johnson, 2010, p. 133, footnote 120 for references). It adopts a broad view of the 
social prerequisites of the economic system. As such, meeting developmental needs can be useful 
both in terms of alleviating immediate costs of poverty and in promoting and sustaining longer term 
economic growth.42 The welfare economist need not be confined to mere Pareto optimality but can 
also consider any theory of the human good (e.g., the satisfaction of basic needs) (Ackerman, 1997; 
Sen, 1982, 1999). 
In regard to assumptions, welfare developmentalism differs with respect to the nature of market 
failures and relations among efficiency, distribution and production. Specifically, market failures are 
assumed to be widespread and interrelated (drawing on a broad notion of informational failure, 
which justifies merit goods), and underutilization occurs naturally in markets and so efficiency and 
distribution cannot realistically be separated. 
                                                 
41 The central difference between subjective and objective notions of value is that they distinguish the property of an 
object desired by an individual from the property of an object that is beneficial to society (Screpanti & Zamagni, 2005; 
Stiglitz, 1988) (see also Black, 2008). Developmentalism emphasizes the comparability of physical needs in contrast to 
the incomparability of subjective desires (Cooter & Rappoport, 1984) and views these material needs as being common 
to almost all people (Ishikawa, 2001). It suggests that a broad range of social conditions may be factually related to 
productive outcomes (irrespective of individual beliefs) and that the manner in which resource transfers are made is 
important insofar as different goods and means of delivery may mediate the ability of individuals to effectively transform 
material goods into utility. Most types of social policy simultaneously involve the transfer of income (or goods/services 
with monetary value), entail consumption, and take a form that has implications for capability-related concerns such as 
access.  
42 Focusing on the fulfillment of minimum needs can be traced to Pigou (1920, 1952) and utility. Pigou, the central 
economist in the Material Welfare School, had strong links to the classical economic tradition and political economy (see 
Hicks [1975] for discussion). Pigou emphasized, as does welfare developmentalism, the possibility that an increase in net 
total income could occur if poverty were prevented (i.e., efficiency is compatible with fairness). 
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The standard economic view asserts that under conditions of perfect competition, complete 
markets, and—most crucially—perfect information, markets will be efficient (Barr, 1998). Perfect 
competition requires that economic agents be price takers and have equal power. Complete markets 
provide all goods and services for which individuals are prepared to pay a price that covers their 
production costs (e.g., no public goods, no uninsurable risks). In the standard view, there are few 
market failures, a term used by economists to describe the condition in which the production or 
distribution of goods and services by a free market is not efficient. Note that in the traditional view, 
market failures have nothing to do with failures to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., equality). 
Economists differ in their views as to the extent of market failures. The Chicago School most clearly 
approximates the first-best view in economics (Boadway & Bruce, 1984; Fisher, 2003; Just, Hueth, & 
Schmidtz, 2004; Reder, 1982), a belief that the real world comes close to the ideal world. The first-
best view tends to downplay the extent and significance of market imperfections and treat each 
market imperfection with its own first-best solution. In contrast, other economists assume that 
market failures are more widespread and interrelated (Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 2009). 
Like the second-best economic perspective that supports a larger welfare state, developmentalism 
does not assume that ―perfectly competitive and perfectly clearing markets‖ (Atkinson, 1999, p. 8; 
Schettkat, 2003) are common.43 However, developmentalism suggests that information failures have 
special relevance beyond traditional market failures (Bator, 1958).44  
Most economists think of information failure in terms of asymmetric information, where at least one 
party to a transaction has relevant information but the others do not.45 Developmentalism suggests a 
somewhat broader notion that is related to what are termed merit goods. Merit goods, discussed 
                                                 
43 It is important to clarify how market failures are related to the first theorem of welfare economics (i.e., a competitive 
economy is always Pareto efficient). Interpreting the conditions under which the first theorem is true and identifying 
policies by which Pareto efficiency can be restored provides the basis of what is called the market failure approach to 
modern welfare economics (Stiglitz, 1991). As Dufour (2008) notes, by construction, market failure does not involve any 
notion of a desirable distribution of welfare (or income). By its very definition, market failure analysis involves the 
identification of situations in which more wealth could be created while keeping its distribution constant. Thus market 
failure cannot on its own justify redistribution, in the sense that policies for correcting market failures do not necessarily 
aim at producing a desirable income distribution. 
44 Imperfect information justifies insurance and consumption smoothing, which have productive consequences over a 
long time horizon. ―Institutions may arise that are insurance in the sense of protecting against risk, even if they are not 
insurance in a narrow actuarial sense‖ (Barr, 2001, p. 23). They both reduce costs associated with uncertainty and risk 
and increase benefits by reducing underutilization and guaranteeing returns to investment (through sufficient productive 
investment). Apart from paternalism, ―the only argument for universal provision is if the ‗national efficiency‘ externality 
is so strong that it justifies compulsory and/or subsidized consumption of a good by the entire population‖ (Barr, 1992, 
p. 749). The same can be said for in-kind benefits that entail overriding consumer sovereignty (Barr, 1998). For instance, 
rather than waiting for market or family structures to break down, these policies serve as ―ex ante actuarial insurance 
with a long time horizon‖ as opposed to being ―actuarial ex post‖ (Barr, 1992, p. 795). See Hoff (1996) for discussion of 
major channels through which the distribution of wealth may affect efficiency in situations of imperfect information. 
45 The main varieties of asymmetric information include adverse selection and moral hazard. While in the former the 
ignorant party lacks information while negotiating an agreed-upon understanding of or contract to the transaction, in the 
latter the ignorant party lacks information about performance of the agreed-upon transaction or lacks the ability to 
retaliate for a breach of the agreement. This notion of information failure is focused on discrete contracts or transactions 
between individual agents, whereas the notion of information failure I am using should be understood as being related to 
merit goods. It is both more social in nature (with respect to merit goods) and broader, not in the sense of being 
nonutilitarian but in terms of expanding what is thought of as having economic (and not simply social) implications. It is 
not restricted to information about quality or price. In this sense, lack of knowledge of externalities is in a sense a type of 
information failure, though not in the terms in which information failure is conventionally understood. 
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more fully below, imply a particular sort of information failure that suggest that social benefits 
exceed social costs (or generate positive externalities), but individuals generally only recognize the 
private value, not the full social value. In this sense, merit goods imply that individuals are not the 
best judge of their own welfare (Barr, 1992) and arise as a response to mistaken (or absent) 
preferences or unknown probabilities (Sandmo, 1983). Developmentalism sees policymakers as 
potentially better informed than citizens about product quality, price, and unpredictable probabilities 
(and nonactuarial risk) that may incur costs. Moreover, policymakers may have better information 
about the social benefits of the consumption of particular goods, especially if a broad range of social 
goods are important correlates of economic productivity (and lower poverty). 
With respect to the way that we think about efficiency, distribution, and production, the mainstream 
perspective assumes no underutilization of resources. The first welfare theorem states that a market 
outcome is efficient, primarily because the invisible hand of the market aggregates individual 
decisions into a Pareto efficient allocation. The second welfare theorem states that any efficient 
allocation can be sustainable by a competitive equilibrium.46 The first fundamental theorem is 
―probably the single most powerful result in the theory of market economies‖ (Just et al., 2004, pp. 
27–28). One of the central consequences of the second fundamental welfare theorem was the ability 
to focus on efficiency issues and ignore distribution issues (Atkinson, 2003; Stiglitz, 1991) (see also 
Klasen, 2008).  
The standard economic view assumes that wage rates are set equal to one‘s marginal productivity, 
and the adequacy of wages is not considered. Competitive markets ensure that people are paid their 
contribution to production, and this explains income distribution (Palley, 2003). There is thus no 
economic concern about subsistence wages beyond physiological subsistence and reproduction 
(Lefeber, 2000). The wage price corresponds to its competitively determined level, not basic needs. 
As described by Ishikawa (2001, p. 26):  
In a state of equilibrium under the fully functioning market economy, the 
markets simultaneously determine all resource allocations to the various 
production processes and income distribution among individuals through 
pricing each of their resources. It is one of the most fundamental theorems 
in microeconomics that the resource allocation thus attained is efficient in 
the sense that there is no resource inefficiently employed in the production 
process and no room to raise individuals‘ utilities from consumption. 
Developmentalism has a very different view of efficiency, distribution, and production. It assumes 
that relatively widespread underutilization of resources occurs and focuses on increasing investment 
and reducing social costs that impede production to improve productive efficiency. 
Developmentalism suggests that market forces do not necessarily provide a distribution of income 
level that guarantees high productivity. Because underutilization occurs, various type of distribution 
                                                 
46 The first welfare theorem supports a case for nonintervention in ideal conditions. The second welfare theorem states 
that every Pareto-optimal allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium after a suitable (lump sum) 
redistribution of initial endowments (e.g., Pareto efficient allocation can be attained through the price system). Lump 
sum transfers, being based on characteristics exogenous to the taxpayer, can bring about any desired distribution of 
income or goods without efficiency loss, whereas taxes related to income cause inefficiency through their effect on 
individual labor supply. This is the theoretical basis for the separation of efficiency and equity (Furman & Stiglitz, 1998). 
It is unclear how any real-world government might enact such redistributions (see Blaug [2007] for a more extensive 
discussion).  
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can have productive consequences. By suggesting that distribution and efficiency are not just related 
but that distribution can theoretically contribute to efficiency, developmentalism seeks to broaden the 
informational basis on which efficiency is considered and promote a longer term view of efficiency.  
Finally, with respect to policy implications, welfare developmentalism has consequences for likely 
outcomes of government intervention, redistribution, the goals of social policy, and the types of 
social policy supported. In the standard view, markets are generally efficient. Market failures could 
justify governmental intervention but—especially if market failures are discrete and rare—this 
perspective leads to only a residual welfare state (Barr, 1992). The standard economic view tends to 
argue that even if there is a need, the government is unlikely to get complicated interventions right, 
so simple solutions are preferable (Lipsey, 2007; Rodrik, 2007b).47 Moreover, the prospects for 
policy from the mainstream perspective are limited because government actions are constrained by 
information limitations and are likely to lead to economic distortions. The standard economic view 
may support limited government intervention but does not justify more extensive social policy (Barr, 
1998). 
The likely outcomes of government intervention differ for those within the traditional perspective 
who hold to the first-best view and those who hold to a second-best perspective. Those in the first-
best school tend to see markets as working quite well with few distortions. Thus, interventions 
almost always are detrimental to efficiency. Those who hold the second-best view argue that if there 
are market imperfections, market outcomes can be improved by well-designed interventions. 
However, there is no clear guidance for exactly how to think about policy interventions, how 
policies may interact, and which types of interventions will be most likely to lead to net benefits. 
Though equality and efficiency may be partially compatible from the second-best perspective, there 
is no clear explanation for how distributive policies could actually contribute to economic 
performance in a positive sum manner. In short, the second-best view does not tell us what kind is 
best.48 For instance, as Bent Greve (2007, p. 45) notes with regard to the Nordic welfare states, 
―arguments for public sector intervention, for example due to market failure, which has been the 
historical reason for intervention, do not per se give any indication of which type of intervention is 
needed.‖   
                                                 
47 The reluctance of mainstream theory to deal with these details may have more to do with reservations about 
emphasizing second-best theory than denying that it more realistically describes the world we live in (Koning & 
Jongeneel, 1997). From this perspective, economic reality may be too complex to make the designing of second-best 
policies practicable (Lipsey, 2007; Lipsey & Lancaster, 1996; Mishan, 1962; Ng, 1979) and as a result, economists fear 
that arbitrary political interventions might follow. The theory of second-best does not imply a program of vigorous 
government intervention or indeed much of policy substance. Lipsey (2007, p. 356) writes with regard to the general 
theory of the second-best that, ―achieving an economy-wide second-best optimum allocation looks even more difficult 
than achieving the first-best.‖ He cautions that ―any policy may have unexpected and undesirable consequences in 
apparently unrelated parts of the economy.‖ See also Demsetz (1969). 
48 Based on second-best insights, one can conclude both that there is one economics (neoclassical) but many policy 
options and that the problem in economics lays in simplistic rules of thumb on policy (Rodrik, 2007a). The latter point is 
not a new insight but was explored many years ago by Gunnar Myrdal (1973) and Paul Streeten (1967) in the notions of 
illegitimate isolation and misplaced aggregation. Illegitimate isolation (of contributory causes) is the overestimation of the 
independence of a key variable as a sufficient and necessary condition of development, failing to place it correctly as one 
among several complementary variables, all of which are necessary to produce an overall developmental dynamic. 
Misplaced aggregation is the adding together of elements of a system to produce a single variable that cannot operate as a 
coherent single cause. Rather, it becomes a diffuse amalgam of many overlapping ingredients containing distinctly 
different component parts, not all of which will move together or in the same direction in their influence. See also 
Myrdal (1974). 
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Developmentalism explains the possibility of sustained substantial interference with the market with 
minimal adverse consequences. If market failures are widespread and interconnected, governmental 
actions to address these could very well have positive effects. Developmentalism suggests that a 
particular version of information failure broadens the scope for intervention based on the 
importance of merit goods. Specifically, information failures, in the context of dynamic efficiency 
(McCartney, 2004), open the door to merit goods (Musgrave, 1957, 1959). The notion of merit 
goods is controversial (e.g., Jansson, 2006; Head, 2007) but generally refers to goods that have 
positive externalities, where the social benefit exceeds the private benefit, and so would be 
underconsumed if individuals only consume as much as they prefer. Examples of merit goods are 
health care and education (see also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 2002).49 Although sometimes equated with public goods, merit goods are quite distinct.50 
Barr (1992, pp. 748–749) suggests that these goods are ―a response to a conventional externality 
(e.g., clean water) or a consumption externality (e.g., where a rich person‘s utility is dependent upon 
a poor person‘s ‗good‘ consumption as opposed to their income).‖ For developmentalists, lower 
consumption than is socially optimal could occur if policymakers are better informed than citizens: a 
problem of information failure. Underconsumption could also occur if individuals are myopic short-
term utility maximizers, who may not choose optimal levels of these merit goods. Developmentalism 
suggests that the possibility of merit goods and their corresponding information failure result in 
market failure and justify larger scale governmental interventions. 
Traditionally, the idea is that the government decides what goods and services are merit goods—
which may be subsidized or provided free of charge (so that consumption does not depend primarily 
on the ability to pay)—based upon societal values and judgments. But these decisions may also be 
made based on consequentialist perspectives: if consumption of merit goods is encouraged, this may 
actually lead to increased output in the long run.51 It is less the knowability of the correlation of 
                                                 
49 Merit goods are defined in the OECD Social Expenditure Database and contrasted with income maintenance 
programs. Often associated with the Nordic welfare model (Arter, 1999; Kiander, 2004), developmentalism suggests that 
while it may be possible to identify specific policies as related to merit goods, one should use caution when 
characterizing individual policies in singular, isolated or linear ways (e.g., consumption or production) as opposed to 
understanding how they interact.  
50 Public goods have long been a central concept of public economics (Wuyts, 1992). They are characterized by 
nonexcludability and nonrivalry in their consumption. They are typically seen as very rare. Public goods are goods that 
would not be provided in a free market system, because firms would not be able to adequately charge for them owing to 
nonexcludability and nonrivalry. Merit goods are goods that would be provided in a free market system, but would 
almost certainly be underprovided owing to the fact that the market only takes account of the private costs and benefits and 
not external benefits that may arise to society. 
51 Compared with traditional market failures (Bator, 1958), market failures due to imperfect information and missing 
markets may be widespread in the economy. Problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may be endemic to all 
market situations. Given the possible theoretical pervasiveness of such failures, Stiglitz (reflecting the second-best 
position) notes that the costs of administration of corrective taxes might well exceed the benefits of a given policy. The 
confidence in the efficiency of market solutions reduces hand-in-hand with the confidence in the government to correct 
them. If information failures are as extensive as believed, piecemeal interventions become less effective as they are likely 
to give rise to distortions and overlook complementarities. When thinking about the implications of this for social 
policy, two of the major problems that hamper the actions of governments—limited information and distortions 
(incentives are also particularly important)—may be alleviated by DWSP. If a broad array of social factors have positive 
economic implications (e.g., factors highly correlated with poverty but exogenous to the individual), the need for specific 
information is reduced as a wide array of factors contribute to economic performance. The possibility of distortions, 
recognized in Abba Lerner‘s (1944) diminishing marginal utility, are minimized to the extent that benefits minimize 
moral hazard that results from relying heavily on income-based eligibility. Lipsey (2007) has noted that piecemeal 
changes are more feasible in a parochial, specific policy context than when making judgments about an entire society‘s 
R E D I S C O V E R I N G  S O C I A L  I N V E S T M E N T  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T A L  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  P O L I C I E S :  






C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
36 
interrelation that is pertinent than the actuality that many social conditions may turn out to have 
economic implications, whether fully recognized or not. 
Among the various schools of neoclassical economics, the Chicago School has offered the most 
strident criticism of redistribution and the welfare state. The microeconomic work of Stigler (1961, 
1966, 1975) and macroeconomic work of Friedman (1953, 1956, 1960, 1968)—inspiring public 
choice theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1971) and minimal government arguments 
(Canto et al., 1983)—form a generalized view of the welfare state. The welfare state is generally 
considered to have ―distorting effects on the automatic clearing mechanism by affecting wages, labor 
supply, or labor costs‖ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 144). In other words, it interferes with the 
clearance of surpluses and shortages by restricting the ability of prices to change and obstructing the 
ability of the economy to achieve equilibrium. If markets were generally efficient to begin with, 
distorting them is likely to produce inefficiencies. While research has dealt with issues such as 
savings rates, crowding out of capital investment, and the like, the literature has tended to focus on 
the negative-incentive effects of social benefits on labor supply and mobility at the micro level, along 
with attempts to argue their effects at the macro level (Danziger et al., 1981; Lindbeck, 1981). In this 
view, transfers are least likely to do harm when they remediate severe poverty. 
In contrast, in the developmentalist view, markets are likely to leave some individuals with limited 
resources. A social policy that redistributes income may enable these individuals to gain capabilities 
that will then be productive in the long run. Moreover, redistribution may lead to low-income 
individuals having more access to goods, services, and opportunities, and this may also have 
productive consequences in the future. From a developmentalist perspective, long-term investments 
are important and can lead to growth. Moreover, transfers are most likely to have positive effects 
when they prevent poverty.  
Beyond a generalized critique of the welfare state, neoclassical theory does address in some detail 
likely effects of various types of social policies. The neoclassical view prefers cash benefits to in-kind 
benefits, as I discuss below. It has a more nuanced perspective on means-tested versus universal 
benefits, seeing disadvantages of each. Neoclassical theory does not speak in as much detail to family 
policy and ALMP beyond suggesting that the earnings-related, contributory approach should be 
expanded, benefit duration and replacement rates kept low, and subsidies provided should take the 
form of cash. I briefly elaborate on each of these in turn.52 
From an economic efficiency perspective, cash transfers are generally deemed to be superior to in-
kind transfers because they do not directly influence market prices. Economic efficiency is enhanced 
to the extent that the marginal benefit of goods and services sold in an economy is equivalent to 
their marginal social cost. Transfer programs that lower prices of target goods for the poor will 
cause individuals to consume more of these goods than they would in the absence of the program, 
which will result in resources that could be used more efficiently in producing other goods and 
                                                                                                                                                             
welfare. Mishan (1962) notes that it makes designing second-best policies for all situations impractical. However, one 
could argue that to the extent that the latter is a goal, broader more encompassing and uniform social policies are less 
likely to introduce undesirable and unexpected distortions. In other words, the adverse effects (and foregone benefits) of 
piecemeal policymaking undertaken on a grand scale are reduced with preventive institutional policies (Esping-Andersen 
& Korpi, 1987) that anticipate failures and distortions (i.e., universal and in-kind benefits may be best suited to 
overcoming the two main second-best critiques). 
52 The following discussion provides a cursory overview of much more complex arguments regarding the possible 
antipoverty effectiveness and efficiency implications of various types of transfers. A thorough and authoritative 
exploration of these issues is available in Garfinkel (1982). 
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services being allocated to the production of these target goods for the poor. Services available 
without cost may lead to overconsumption and result in the loss of a certain amount of economic 
efficiency. Unlike in-kind subsidy programs, cash transfer programs are not normally affected by 
changes in product prices. Relatedly, cash transfers can help to stabilize the macroeconomy. Once 
the administrative infrastructure is in place, the cost of operating cash transfer programs is often less 
than the cost of providing assistance in-kind. Finally, providing essential goods and services via in-
kind benefits can be seen as restricting freedom of choice and resulting in lower individual utility 
than cash (where actors can reallocate consumption between all goods according to their 
preferences).  
The neoclassical perspective also speaks to the relative merits of means-tested versus universal 
benefits, but here the preferred approach is less clear. Advocates of means-tested benefits typically 
endorse target efficiency, preferring programs in which a high proportion of the benefits go to those 
most in need. Underlying the targeting argument is a notion of a tradeoff where the benefits 
distributed to the nonpoor are assumed to lower the amount available for redistribution to the poor 
(Howe, 1991). Relatedly, means-testing is associated with lower expenditures, whereas universal 
programs require higher funding—necessitating higher taxation and employer costs—and may 
damage economic performance (Eardley et al., 1996). Although some have been concerned with the 
costs of administering a means test, means testing can be quite efficient if everyone files an income 
tax return, there is adequate information to determine payment, and the administrative machinery 
can efficiently disburse payments (Atkinson, 1995b; Cornes, 1995; Sen, 1995). 
On the other hand, traditional means-tested benefits, with relatively few exceptions, have relatively 
high benefit reduction rates (BRR) to ensure that benefits go only to those who are most needy. 
High BRR mean low work incentives and labor markets may be distorted as a result. High BRR can 
be seen as creating poverty traps in which individuals are economically better off receiving benefits 
than trying to combine them with low-wage work. 
Mainstream theory is less specific regarding family policy, which encompasses family service 
expenditure, public child care coverage, and the like (OECD Social Expenditure Database). The 
decision to have children has historically been treated as a private choice, and the economic 
consequences for the household a private concern (Gornick & Meyers, 2003) in contrast to the view 
of children as public goods (Folbre, 1996, 2008).53 Economic rationales for societal intervention in 
family time allocation decisions have been largely absent, and distributional concerns are typically 
intrahousehold rather than interhousehold.54 Issues of efficiency seldom arise, and it is assumed that 
parents will not underinvest in children. Agnosticism prevails about whether subsidizing families 
with children can be rationalized as the correction of a market failure if investments in children 
generate positive social externalities. This framework takes the household (not the individual) as the 
                                                 
53 Contrary to the view that the utility function of a typical economic agent is generally assumed to be independent of the 
consumption of others, what happens in one household may affect what happens in another (see Komlos and Salamon 
[2005] for discussion of interdependent utility functions). 
54 In the traditional economic view, definitions of productivity, which are based on the price mechanism and presuppose 
a market transaction, conventionally defined the productivity of social production or reproductive work (public sector 
social services or household production) as zero or close to zero (Andersson, 2005). More recent economic analyses are 
concerned not only with intrahousehold outcomes but also with the effects of family policies on social welfare (e.g., 
Bernal & Fruttero, 2008).  
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agent in family decisions.55 Family members who work in the market will compensate those who 
specialize in household production during the childrearing phase and later in life, which postulates a 
permanent, unanimous family (Lundberg, 2002). 
Economists typically approach the labor market from a simplified perspective that assumes perfect 
competitiveness, where in the absence of laws workers and employers have perfect information, 
transaction costs are absent, and workers—choosing to maximize their utility function (income or 
leisure)—earn their marginal product of labor. These assumptions are then relaxed, deviations from 
perfectly competitive labor markets are considered, including that there are costs associated with 
employment and switching jobs. ALMPs or measures to improve the functioning of the labor 
market that are directed towards the unemployed (Calmfors, 1994) come from a recognition of 
imperfections in the labor market. For example, workers have insufficient investment in skills 
because they are severely credit constrained. Firms are not willing to finance general qualifications 
(Becker, 1962, 1964) and will only in part pay the expenditures for developing firm-specific skills. 
Thus, the mainstream approach favors better loan markets over direct subsidies to training 
(Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999) and sees little role for ALMP. Heckman et al. (1999, p. 2080) conclude 
that ―when effective, ALMPs make economically disadvantaged persons less poor and modestly 
increase employment among the unemployed, however, these gains (if present) are small and it is 
unlikely that a substantial increase in government funding will improve work force skills.‖ Economic 
theory provides little clear guidance to the effect of labor institutions on economic performance 
(Freeman, 2008).56 
The neoclassical view on social policy suggests that maximum economic efficiency should result 
from low overall social policy expenditures, as limitations on the budgets would serve to keep taxes 
and labor disincentives low. In this view, these policies combined with the economic efficiency that 
results should lead to low income poverty in the long term. Further, mainstream economists tend 
not to consider the multidimensionality and potentially complex interactions associated with how 
social policies are combined. 
I argued earlier that developmentalist social policy focused on in-kind benefits, nonmeans-tested 
benefits, family expenditures and ALMP, and higher levels of expenditures. I briefly discuss these 
aspects again, highlighting the economic logic that leads to these policy directions. According to 
inclusive welfare developmentalism, in-kind benefits are advantageous because they guarantee 
consumption of developmentally-relevant goods and services, facilitate political support by the 
nonpoor (so are likely to be more adequate and accessible), are less likely than cash to be wasted by 
people, and are less likely to generate moral hazard. Economists see cash as important because 
parents prefer cash transfers over in-kind in that they can spend them as they see fit. In contrast, 
                                                 
55 In the context of a unitary household, gender equality in command over resources need not require equality in market 
wages or earnings opportunities. In this view, if specialization in the household is efficient due to comparative advantage 
or sector-specific learning, it will also be socially desirable. Since childrearing takes up only a portion of the total lifespan 
but tends to coincide with a period when intense investments in market skills are optimal for workers, an efficient family 
solution will involve some intertemporal redistribution. 
56 Perhaps a central reason for this is the possibility that ―institutions that work in one way in one country may work 
differently in another because the rest of the institutional structure differs‖ (Freeman, 1998, p. 6). Freeman notes that 
too little is known about how labor institutions fit together as systems. A system exists when the contribution of one 
institution to outcomes depends on the configuration of other institutions. Complementarity among labor and other 
practices is where policies may be productive whereas absent the other institutions, they may be less productive or even 
counterproductive. 
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developmentalism would suggest that services related to the reduction of disease, creation of wealth, 
and improved capabilities broadly are a source of development within and outside of individual 
households. This then justifies in-kind benefits even if there is some short-term efficiency cost. 
The developmentalist perspective emphasizes universal benefits because they should result in higher 
uptake and lower moral hazard than means-tested benefits. While universal benefits entail a leakage 
of resources to the nonpoor, means-tested benefits are costly to administer, tend to stigmatize the 
recipient, and impose costs on the claimant. Foremost among the costs associated with means 
testing are moral hazard, lower uptake, probable inadequacy, and the costs associated with the 
occurrence of poverty. Esping-Andersen (2002, p. 25) suggests that ―diminishing public health, 
pension, or social care expenditure is unlikely to produce any real cost savings since households will 
compensate with market purchase or with self-servicing.‖ In other words, meager means-tested 
benefits ―will not result in lower net household money outlays‖ (Esping-Andersen, 2002, p. 25) but 
may result in unmet needs. 
Putting aside both the debatable economic assumption that public services tend to be delivered 
inefficiently and the normative assumption about the inherent value of choice (e.g., Streeten, 1993), 
one can argue that because means-tested programs typically result in low levels of coverage and 
limited access, there may be substantial future and cumulative costs (and foregone productivity) 
associated with means testing. A related argument can be extended to family policy and ALMP as 
well. Developmentalism tends to see children primarily as public goods and production within the 
home not simply as consumption but also as an investment with positive social externalities 
(assuming that underinvestment is common).57 Finally, where perfectly competitive labor markets do 
not exist, there are substantial costs for the individual worker and the family and benefits of 
innovation, making investments in ALMP justifiable. 
The developmentalist view of DWSPs, including the way in which they are combined and interact, 
differs from the mainstream view and suggests effects that are not well-explained by mainstream 
economic theory. The developmentalist view of social policy suggests that maximum economic 
efficiency and poverty reduction should result from extensive universal benefits and in-kind benefits 
in combination with high overall expenditure. The benefits that are generated will outweigh any 
adverse effects of higher taxes or labor disincentives in the long term. In this view, these policies 
should offer future social benefits as well as prevent socially costly poverty.  
The developmentalist principles proposed earlier are consistent with and built on several economic 
observations, which are different from the economic observations of the mainstream model (Table 
3). In the traditional economic view, social policy typically harms efficiency, whereas the principles 
that inform developmentalism suggest that social policy can make a net contribution to economic 
performance. In the mainstream view, the general exception to the notion that redistribution 
through social policy is harmful is the case of market failures. However, there is little policy guidance 
                                                 
57 As Thurow (1974, p. 194) notes, ―economists deal with efficiency differences between firms by relying on the sacred 
right of the inefficient to fail, but this is clearly an inadequate response to inefficient families. One of the key reasons for 
our general interest in minimum standards of living …is our desire to prevent ‗failing families.‘‖ Treating inefficient 
families as economists treat inefficient firms would incur high social costs and foregone social benefits, which signals an 
important role for prevention. In other words, as Kahn (2009, p. 7) has noted, child and family policy is no longer 
simply about problems of ―child saving‖ and ―child welfare‖ but rather about ―the limitless potential of each wondrously 
individual child.‖ 
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for anything but a residual welfare state. In contrast, developmentalism offers a rationale for 
redistribution and more specific guidance for policy.  
In Table 3, the middle column lists the developmentalist principles that were identified as having 
important implications for social policy. Each of these principles is implied by observations and 
assertions about economic relationships that were discussed earlier and are listed in the first column 
of the table.  
The table shows the chain of logic leading to DWSPs. Because there are basic needs that are not 
always met in the market, governmental provisions are needed. For these provisions to be of high 
quality, expenditures need to be fairly generous. Another example shown on the table is that not all 
goods and services are available in sufficient quantity and quality for all. This leads to a principle of 
ensuring access to goods and services, which implies a role for in-kind benefits.  
Table 3. The Economic Underpinning of Developmentalist Principles 
Key economic underpinning observations Developmentalist principles  DWSPs 
There are minimal or basic needs that may or 
may not be met for all people in the market. 




It is cost-effective to avoid social problems 
before they occur. 
Prevention of future social costs Family policy 
ALMP 
Certain types of governmental actions can 
encourage human capital investment and 
lead to efficiencies beyond what would 
occur in the market.  
Activation that reduces 
disincentives and maximizes 
incentives/ability to earn  
Market allocations are not generally optimal, 
and there is a role for redistribution in 
improving productive efficiency. Not all 
goods and services are available in sufficient 
quantity and quality for all people, and these 
commodities are important to productivity.  
Access to goods and 
services/Entitlements based on 
relationship to economic 
development (not exclusively 






Maximize the utilization of 
resources  
There are information failures regarding merit 
goods (where current consumption enables 
future production).  
Guaranteed consumption of 
developmentally beneficial 
goods and services  
There are considerable costs associated with 
poverty both in terms of direct costs and 
foregone productivity.  




Developmentalism is based on economic observations and relationships that generally differ from 
the standard economic view. In the developmentalist view, competitive markets may not allocate 
resources between competing uses in an optimal fashion. Market failures are widespread, which 
leads to a variety of policy interventions. The developmentalist view sees social policy as yielding 
benefits, especially when the policies can be seen as investments. The economic logic of 
developmentalism places a special emphasis on distribution and its potential positive contribution to 
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productive efficiency, which implies that social policies have both protective and productive 
functions.  
The notion that in-kind and universal benefits, as well as ALMP and expenditures on family policy, 
should not just decrease poverty in the short term but also build the factors that contribute to 
economic performance in the long term, is at odds with aspects of mainstream theory. Welfare 
developmentalism hypothesizes that different combinations of social policy may prevent social costs 
through minimizing poverty associated with children and families, containing direct economic costs 
by not inhibiting labor market participation, and bolstering future productivity through the 
reduction of underutilized resources by guaranteeing access to and adequate consumption of 
developmentally essential goods and services. These propositions are testable. Although a thorough 
test was beyond the scope of this paper, a straightforward preliminary empirical test of the key ideas 
was undertaken and is summarized below.58  
Key Findings from a Simple Empirical Test 
Are policies that reflect developmentalist principles associated with lower poverty (market and 
posttax/transfer)? The analyses undertaken were based on a sample of 82,287 households from 18 
OECD countries in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) around the year 2000 and included 
families with at least one dependent child (< 18 years of age) and at least one working age adult (25–
54).59 Policy variables were drawn from the OECD and European Social Statistics Social Protection 
Expenditure and Receipts (ESSPROS) database. Finally, demographic variables were from the LIS, 
and macroeconomic variables were from the OECD. 
Several hypotheses were proposed. The first was that all six dimensions of DWSPs (i.e., high 
expenditures, in-kind, universal, family-focused, active labor market benefits, and the combination 
of in-kind benefits that are universal) will be negatively related to posttax/ transfer poverty. The 
second was that DWSP variables together will have a stronger negative relationship with poverty 
than the simple sum of each individual DWSP variable. The third was that all six dimensions of 
DWSPs will show a small negative relationship with pretax/transfer (market) poverty. The fourth 
was that DWSP variables together will be associated with a greater decline in market poverty than 
either variable individually.60 
While I will not discuss model specification details here, the analysis consisted of two sets of models, 
focusing on posttax/transfer poverty and pretax/transfer poverty (both measured as < 50% of 
country-specific median income). Within each set, four models were examined. Two were designed 
to confirm prior research using dummy variables for countries and dummy variables for regimes. 
Two were designed to explore hypotheses using DWSP variables (i.e., total social expenditure, focus 
                                                 
58 While I have argued that developmentalism conceptually suggests that certain types of social policy may make a net 
contribution to economic performance over time, the empirical measures employed in this paper are limited to detecting 
minimal efficiency losses and cannot attempt to detect efficiency gains. However, articulating the theoretical possibility 
of the latter is important to (1) highlighting key differences between the economic logic of developmentalism and the 
traditional economic view and (2) developing expectations about different types of social policy. Further, more rigorous 
research into the possible productive effects of social policy should be the focus of future fourth generation studies.  
59 A sample aged 25–64 was also analyzed with no discernible difference in results. 
60 The analysis included a combination variable that captured the extent to which in-kind benefits are universal. The 
reason for suspecting an interaction between universal and in-kind benefits is that they are believed to collectively (i.e., 
synergistically) have a stronger impact of guaranteeing consumption of resources that are inversely related to poverty 
(especially costly poverty) while minimizing economic distortions and information requirements.  
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on expenditures on in-kind, universal, family-focused policies, ALMP, and focus on in-kind 
universal expenditures) and a DWSP index (linear and quadratic). All models controlled for 
demographics and country-level GDP and unemployment rates. 
The analyses yielded several key if tentative results. First, DWSPs, with the exception of a main 
effect for in-kind and universal expenditures, are associated with a decrease in posttax/transfer 
poverty. Second, expenditures on in-kind benefits that are universal corroborated the synergistic 
relationship between DWSPs and lower poverty. Third, with the exception of a main effect for 
universal and in-kind expenditures, DWSPs remained salient in reducing market poverty. Fourth, 
expenditures on in-kind benefits that are universal appeared to be associated with lower poverty. 
Fifth, the DWSP Index is associated with lower posttax/transfer and market poverty (though not as 
a quadratic function in the latter case). Broadly, confirmatory analyses support the continued 
importance of the regime categorization as well as the relevance of policy variation across countries. 
In terms of future directions, the simple analysis based on the conceptual framework outlined in this 
paper suggests several more or less applied lessons. First, what happens within social expenditure 
matters for both posttax/transfer and market poverty. While generosity is important, it is the way 
that expenditures are combined that deserve central scrutiny. Second, DWSPs may both support 
earnings and reduce posttax/transfer poverty. Social policy analyses must make efforts to more 
seriously account for productive alongside redistributive effects, incorporating cutting edge 
knowledge on the costs of poverty and underutilization of human potential. Third, DWSPs may 
minimize economic distortions and provide a range of goods and services that support productive 
economic activity and minimize social costs. The tentative results presented here underscore that 
more rigorous research is needed. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
I suggested that reconsidering the disparate ideas of social development in the context of new issues 
facing the welfare state made it possible to distill developmentalist principles that are relevant to 
thinking about productive social policy. Among key arguments made in this paper, welfare 
developmentalism proposes that (1) distribution may make a positive contribution to production, (2)  
certain types of poverty entail social costs, (3) underutilization occurs and prevention is important 
and valuable, (4) the effects of limited information and distortions are minimized by DWSPs (where 
income-based eligibility is minimized and social factors are broadly correlated with economic 
outcomes), and (5) policy interactions and synergy are important to the productive effects of 
DWSPs. The conceptual framework in this paper has a range of general implications for how we 
think about and analyze social policy in an environment in which it must increasingly be justified on 
the grounds of being a productive investment. I will conclude by mentioning three ways in which 
the developmental perspective might impact our thinking. In particular, I will briefly note 
implications for policy, research, and practice. 
First, clarifying social developmentalist ideas may increase opportunities for policy-relevant learning 
across societies that are comparatively quite diverse. This study set out to make a conceptual 
contribution to understanding whether the same types of social policies are related to poverty levels. 
I argue that this approach has more policy relevance than a study of welfare regimes, as a finding 
that a particular regime has low poverty provides little direction to a country outside that regime in 
that it suggests that a wholesale overturning of institutions as well as policies may be required to 
achieve lower poverty.  
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In contrast, the findings using this approach suggest that poverty reduction may be able to be 
achieved by focusing more resources on ALMP, family policies, or in-kind policies that are universal, 
a set of policy reforms that may be achievable. While these analyses are simple and limited and 
should be corroborated with additional studies, if they hold, these findings suggest that in addition 
to overall expenditure effort, what happens within expenditure and the way that different types of 
expenditures interact may be quite important. While straightforward policy inferences may still be 
difficult for some countries, this approach suggests some policies to consider.  
More broadly, and perhaps importantly, the developmentalist approach has the potential to help 
policymakers think in a more nuanced way about policy approaches and their interaction. It suggests 
that social policy transfers are neither simply about consumption nor production but that transfers 
can entail both aspects simultaneously so that policy analyses and policy debates should not be 
carried out as if certain transfers are only about passive distribution and consumption while others 
are about active investments. To the extent that individual policies do both synergistically and 
cumulatively, social expenditures cannot easily be rechanneled from passive to active social policies. 
The political economy tradition reminds us that the economic and social are often fundamentally 
inextricable, especially insofar as a wide range of social conditions may have economic consequences.   
The notion that most welfare states have components of all typologies in their system and that 
policy is neither solely protective nor productive (i.e., purely economic or social) suggests that it may 
be misleading to look for either an exclusively developmentalist regime or specific policies that are 
singularly developmentalist. Despite the difficulty of examining interaction effects, it is clear that 
policies should not be evaluated in isolation from one another. While regime thinking risks 
obscuring important policy details and limits the possibility of learning based on common metrics, 
very narrow cost-benefit analysis that attempts to hold all other policies constant could risk 
committing epistemological errors if there are in fact synergies associated with particular policy 
combinations.61 Moreover, there are likely to be significant economic benefits to preventing poverty 
that we do not yet fully understand. While this analysis suggests that certain social policies tend to 
simultaneously have both protective and productive effects, much more extensive and rigorous 
research will be necessary to confirm and expand on the tentative findings of this study. 
Second, in the larger study on which this paper is based, I acknowledged that there remain 
considerable challenges to crossnational research. In addition to data limitations, I argued that an 
even more formidable barrier to progress has been the lack of consensus on a conceptual framework 
for thinking comparatively about productive social policies across countries. The theoretical 
                                                 
61 It is important to avoid committing errors, such as crediting a particular policy for working when it is in fact a 
combination of policies that are producing the desired result (type I), discrediting a particular policy because 
supplemental policies that might contribute to its effectiveness are not being considered (type II), or mismeasuring the 
effect of a program or intervention that has been incompletely implemented (type III). While Third Way-inspired 
research tends to emphasize a selective range of what it considers to be productive social policies, an increasingly 
important viewpoint, what is referred to as the social investment perspective (see contributions to Morel et al., 2012) has never 
achieved consensus (Jenson, 2009). Scholars working in this area should be careful not to assume that (1) individual 
policies can be considered as exclusively compensatory or investment-oriented or (2) policies can be considered absent 
their potential interactive effects. In other words, it is not straightforward to conclude that benefit generosity creates 
earnings disincentives or to recommend employment-conditional earnings subsidies similar to the EITC (e.g., 
Kenworthy, 2008). For instance, to the extent that policies such as the EITC are associated with low wage, service-
oriented labor markets, the introduction of such policies may erode generous welfare state benefits if it contributes to 
the expansion of low-wage labor markets with jobs that cannot sustain extensive taxes and transfers. It is critical to 
understand the complex impacts of existing policies and their preconditions. 
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synthesis summarized in this paper suggests that it is possible to formulate theoretically informed 
empirical hypotheses. Several research implications follow from this analysis. 
One important research implication related to the policy implications above is the capacity of 
developmentalist principles and DWSPs to be further revised and expanded to accommodate new 
hypotheses about additional social policies (e.g., education and healthcare) or other institutional 
features. A second implication of this research is that it points to the increasing feasibility of 
crossnational comparisons that are theory-driven and predictive, based on improved data. Finally, it 
may be especially important for future research to consider the effects of time and the depth and 
persistence of poverty, which were not considered in this analysis. While disincentive effects (i.e., 
costs may become apparent rather quickly), investment effects (i.e., benefits related to cognitive 
skills, health, and the like) may accrue over many years.62 
Third, in terms of practice, this research compels us to reconsider the focus on the needy and the 
preoccupation with social control that typically pervades the strengths-based view in social work 
(Gray, 2013). Developmentalist social policy encourages us to reemphasize how it is that social 
institutions structure the environment in which human behavior occurs. Many social service and 
community advocates tend to focus on the most needy (i.e., remediation as opposed to prevention) 
and preserving individual choice and autonomy through cash and vouchers. Developmentalism 
should reignite the debate about what constitutes social control and to what extent compulsory 
benefits and in-kind services guarantee wide-ranging social rights rather than merely circumscribing 
individual prerogatives.63 Finally, it reminds us that social effort is never strictly about resource 
transfers that have no implication for capabilities (in Sen‘s terms).64 All transfers have implications 
for participation, access, and the like, just as it is impossible to consider income poverty, 
consumption poverty, and social exclusion to be mutually exclusive well-being concepts. 
Practitioners should not dismiss or disparage transfers as disproportionately benefiting the middle 
class and or privilege participatory policies as uniquely well-suited to the poor.  
There are a variety of demographic, fiscal, and social pressures facing modern welfare states. The old 
assumption of the obvious value of the welfare state is no longer as widely accepted as it once was. 
There is, as reflected in the social investment notion, an emerging discourse centered on social 
protection as a productive factor. The standard economic view (i.e., that there is an equality-efficiency 
tradeoff) prevails. There remains no clear conceptual framework for thinking about whether and 
how social policies may be both protective and productive. The purpose of this paper was to show 
how social development thought, a loose collection of ideas, can be refined and reinterpreted in the 
context of comparative welfare state ideas to help identify types of social policy that may have 
                                                 
62 DWSPs could not only minimize future social costs but also maximize future social benefits by making mobility (and 
future productivity) a realistic possibility and preventing the creation of tomorrow‘s precarious worker with lifetime low 
wages, poor quality jobs, frequent spells of unemployment, and assistance dependency, all of which impact their own 
future prospects. Social policy should be seen in the context of the potentially very negative effects of economic 
hardship on educational attainment and subsequent life chances. Eradication of child poverty yields very positive results, 
not only in terms of alleviating material hardship in childhood but also because economic security is a vital precondition 
for later achievement (Kangas & Palme, 2005). 
63 It is misleading to assume that certain types of benefits are inherently paternalistic or reflect expressions of social 
control. When they are considered interacting with other elements (e.g., when in-kind are combined with universal 
benefits), paternalism is less of an issue. 
64 See Johnson (2014b) for more on the compatibility of developmentalist policy with Amartya Sen‘s capability approach. 
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productive outcomes. I proposed criteria for helping define and identify what makes existing social 
policies an investment.  
I have argued that theories that explain the welfare states‘ development are more advanced than 
those that explain its effects (at least its potentially broader effects). As a result, we do not know 
enough about the benefits relative to the widely perceived costs of the welfare state. I surmised that 
the promise of ongoing research has been hampered by viewing the welfare state as a response to 
developmental problems and not also in part a source of development and contributor to 
production. I concluded that there is a need to reorient research away from how countries cluster 
together into regimes or mutually exclusive worlds and toward disaggregating effort at the policy 
level based on theoretical expectations grounded on the possibility of productive (and not just 
protective) effects. I formulated a set of principles reflecting this possibility and categorized, as 
developmentalist, several mature welfare state social policy that I labeled DWSPs. This framework 
compelled a reappraisal of the political economic roots of welfare states and what classical ideas 
teach us about the limits of markets and role of the state. The analysis yielded limited evidence for 
the predicted effects of policies that most closely express these developmentalist principles. 
As rapid economic and social changes have unfolded at the advent of the 21st century—
accompanied by the internationalization of social policy ideas, opportunities for policy transfer, and 
a trend toward hybridity—there has been a temptation to succumb to linguistically popular 
discourses and pragmatic policy prescriptions. Policymakers should beware the enticing rhetoric and 
alluring fads that periodically sweep through the social protection world. They almost always entail 
simplifications that are too good to be true, promising returns that are premised on but rarely 
recognize a host of contributing socioeconomic, institutional, and other factors that enable these 
returns. The ongoing EU debate about the modernization of social protection and discourse 
associated with the new social investment state threatens to distract us from contemplating the value of 
traditional social protection policies and recognizing their developmental roots. I asked whether 
universal and in-kind benefits—old social democratic preferences that contradict economic 
commonsense—can be justified on the grounds of extensive market failures (especially information 
failure), underutilization of human potential, costs associated with not preventing poverty, and 
thereby a wide scope for merit goods. 
This paper recognizes the potential in the notion of social investment but begs scholars to proceed 
cautiously in its use. Advocates of institutional welfare states need to fully understand the way that 
longstanding social policies have entailed and continue to constitute productive social investments. 
Doing so hinges on our ability to understand the market failures for which they implicitly 
compensate, lest what emerges from this most recent phase of welfare state thinking is an anemic 
version of the once robust welfare state. The prospects for a social democratic as opposed to 
neoliberal vision of social investment requires us to penetrate the opaque veil behind which vital 
synergies, cumulative effects, and functional equivalencies are obscured and may be rendered 
dormant or severed all together in the event that critical aspects of the welfare state are unwittingly 
rolled back. Resisting the lure of Occam‘s razor, theoreticians and empiricists must work hand-in-
hand to better understand how the traditional core of the welfare state cultivates, albeit in part 
fortuitously, the productive soil of western societies.   
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